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Buffett "Endorses" Mark-to-Market Because of It’s "Strange Results"

Now, before mark-to-market fans get all excited, one needs to take a close look at what Berkshires (BRK.A) Chairman says about it.

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For those not sure where I stand on it, visit a past post.

From the Annual Letter.

Buffett makes the following statement, “We endorse mark-to-market accounting”.

Now, is it for the transparency its advocates seem to think it produces? On that subject Buffett says “Improved “transparency” – a favorite remedy of politicians, commentators and financial regulators for averting future train wrecks – won’t cure the problems that derivatives pose. I know of no reporting mechanism that would come close to describing and measuring the risks in a huge and complex portfolio of derivatives.

Auditors can’t audit these contracts, and regulators can’t regulate them. When I read the pages of “disclosure” in 10-Ks of companies that are entangled with these instruments, all I end up knowing is that I don’t know what is going on in their portfolios (and then I reach for some aspirin).”

If he does not believe that true transparency is possible simply due to the complexity of the instruments, then why would he support mark-to-market? What does the particular accounting system solve or produce that he finds of value?

Later he says:

“At the request of our customers, we write a few tax-exempt bond insurance contracts that are
similar to those written at BHAC, but that are structured as derivatives. The only meaningful
difference between the two contracts is that mark-to-market accounting is required for derivatives whereas standard accrual accounting is required at BHAC.

But this difference can produce some strange results. The bonds covered – in effect, insured – by these derivatives are largely general obligations of states, and we feel good about them. At year end, however, mark-to-market accounting required us to record a loss of $631 million on these derivatives contracts. Had we instead insured the same bonds at the same price in BHAC, and used the accrual accounting required at insurance companies, we would have recorded a small profit for the year. The two methods by which we insure the bonds will eventually produce the same accounting result. In the short term, however, the variance in reported profits can be substantial.

We have told you before that our derivative contracts, subject as they are to mark-to-market
accounting, will produce wild swings in the earnings we report. The ups and downs neither cheer nor bother Charlie and me. Indeed, the “downs” can be helpful in that they give us an opportunity to expand a position on favorable terms. I hope this explanation of our dealings will lead you to think similarly.” (Emphasis mine)

Buffett believes that mark-to-market accounting produces the very inefficient market pricing that he searches for and seeks to exploit. He gives a wonderful example how the same security, held in a different part of Berkshire and thus accounted for differently produces a far different results (one a large loss, the other a small profit).

Buffett’s endorsement of mark-to-market is NOT an endorsement of it as the best accounting system but an endorsement of it as an accounting system prone to producing conditions in which he believes he can profit handsomely.

Let’s see how the MSM and politicians run with this one……

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Berkshire Hathaway Annual Letter

Haven’t read it yet so thoughts on it will come later……

Enjoy….

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Waren Buffett’s 2008 Berkshire Hathaway Letter

Publish at Scribd or explore others: Wills and Trusts Business & Legal berkshire hathaway Warren Buffett

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Saturday Reading

Housing

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– Paul Kedrosky nails it..

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Saturday Humor

From the John Stewart

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Leucadia Reports 10K: Discloses Pershing Square Target Loss $$

Wow… a 82% loss in Target (TGT) for Leucadia (LUK)

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Full 10K

In June 2007, the Company invested $200,000,000 to acquire a 10% limited
partnership interest in Pershing Square, a newly-formed private investment
partnership whose investment decisions are at the sole discretion of Pershing
Square’s general partner. The stated objective of Pershing Square is to create
significant capital appreciation by investing in Target Corporation. The Company
recorded losses under the equity method of accounting from this investment of
$77,700,000 and $85,500,000 in 2008 and 2007, respectively, principally
resulting from declines in the market value of Target Corporation’s common
stock. At December 31, 2008, the book value of the Company’s investment in
Pershing Square was $36,700,000.

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General Growth Files 10K: Comments on Liquidity

This is shaping up to be a classic game of chicken. Just read what General Growth Properties (GGP) has to say.

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Liquidity

Since the third quarter of 2008, liquidity has been our primary issue. As of December 31, 2008, we had approximately $169 million of cash on hand. As of February 26, 2009, we have $1.18 billion in past due debt and an additional $4.09 billion of debt that could be accelerated by our lenders.

The $900 million mortgage loans secured by our Fashion Show and The Shoppes at the Palazzo shopping centers (the “Fashion Show/Palazzo Loans”) matured on November 28, 2008. As we were unable to extend, repay or refinance these loans, on December 16, 2008, we entered into forbearance and waiver agreements with respect to these loan agreements, which expired on February 12, 2009. As of February 26, 2009, we are in default with respect to these loans, but the lenders have not commenced foreclosure proceedings with respect to these properties. Additional past due loans include the $225 million Short Term Secured Loan which matured on February 1, 2009 and the $57.3 million mortgage loan secured by Chico Mall. The $95 million mortgage loan secured by the Oakwood Center, with an original scheduled maturity date of February 9, 2009, was extended to March 16, 2009.

The maturity date of each of the 2006 Credit Facility ($2.58 billion) and the Secured Portfolio Facility ($1.51 billion) could be accelerated by our lenders. As a result of the maturity of the Fashion Show/Palazzo Loans, we entered into forbearance agreements in December 2008 relating to each of the 2006 Credit Facility and Secured Portfolio Facility.

Pursuant and subject to the terms of the forbearance agreement related to the 2006 Credit Facility, the lenders agreed to waive certain identified events of default under the 2006 Credit Facility and forbear from exercising certain of the lenders’ default related rights and remedies with respect to such identified defaults until January 30, 2009. These defaults included, among others, the failure to timely repay the Fashion Show/Palazzo Loans. Without acknowledging the existence or validity of the identified defaults, we agreed that, during the forbearance period, without the consent of the lenders required under the 2006 Credit Facility and subject to certain “ordinary course of business” exceptions, we would not enter into any transaction that would result in a change in control, incur any indebtedness, dispose of any assets or issue any capital stock for other than fair market value, make any redemption or restricted payment, purchase any subordinated debt, or amend the CSA. In addition, we agreed that investments in TRCLP and its subsidiaries would not be made by non-TRCLP subsidiaries and their other subsidiaries, subject to certain ordinary course of business exceptions. We also agreed that certain proceeds received in connection with financings or capital transactions would be retained by the Company subsidiary receiving such proceeds. Finally, the forbearance agreement modified the 2006 Credit Facility to eliminate the obligation of the lenders to provide additional revolving credit borrowings, letters of credit and the option to extend the term of the 2006 Credit Facility.

On January 30, 2009, we amended and restated the forbearance agreement relating to the 2006 Credit Facility. Pursuant and subject to the terms of the amended and restated forbearance agreement, the lenders agreed to extend the period during which they would forbear from exercising certain of their default related rights and remedies with respect to certain identified defaults from January 30, 2009 to March 15, 2009. Without acknowledging or confirming the existence or occurrence of the identified defaults, we agreed to extend the covenants and restrictions contained in the original forbearance agreement and also agreed to certain additional covenants during the extended forbearance period. Certain termination events were added to the forbearance agreement, including foreclosure on certain potential mechanics liens prior to March 15, 2009 and certain cross defaults in respect of six loan agreements relating to the mortgage loans secured by each of the Oakwood, the Fashion Show/Palazzo and Jordan Creek shopping centers as well as certain additional portfolios of properties.

Pursuant and subject to the terms of the forbearance agreement related to the Secured Portfolio Facility, the lenders agreed to waive certain identified events of default under the Secured Portfolio Facility and forbear from exercising certain of the lenders’ default related rights and remedies with respect to such identified defaults until January 30, 2009. These defaults included, among others, the failure to timely repay the Fashion Show/Palazzo Loans. On January 30, 2009, we amended and restated the forbearance agreement relating to the Secured Portfolio Facility.

Pursuant and subject to the terms of the amended and restated forbearance agreement, the lenders agreed to waive certain identified events of default under the Secured Portfolio Facility and agreed to extend the period during which they would forbear from exercising certain of their default related rights and remedies with respect to certain identified defaults from January 30, 2009 to March 15, 2009. We did not acknowledge the existence or validity of the identified defaults.

As a condition to the lenders agreeing to enter into the forbearance agreements described above, we agreed to pay the lenders certain fees and expenses, including an extension fee to the lenders equal to five (5) basis points of the outstanding loan balance under the 2006 Credit Facility and Secured Portfolio Facility in connection with the amendment and restatement of the forbearance agreements relating to such loan facilities.

The expiration of forbearance and waiver agreements related to the Fashion Show/Palazzo Loans permits the lenders under our 2006 Credit Facility and Secured Portfolio Facility to elect to terminate the forbearance and waiver agreements related to those loan facilities. However, as of February 26, 2009, we have not received notice of any such termination, which is required under the terms of these forbearance agreements.

In addition, we have approximately $1.60 billion of consolidated property-specific mortgage loans scheduled to mature in the remainder of 2009. Finally, we have significant accounts payable and liens on our assets, and the imposition of additional liens may occur.

A total of $595 million of unsecured bonds issued by TRCLP are scheduled to mature on March 15, and April 30, 2009. Failure to pay these bonds at maturity, or a default under certain of our other debt, would constitute a default under these and other unsecured bonds issued by TRCLP having an aggregate outstanding balance of $2.25 billion as of December 31, 2008.

We do not have, and will not have, sufficient liquidity to make the principal payments on maturing or accelerated loans or pay our past due payables. We will not have sufficient liquidity to repay any outstanding loans and other obligations unless we are able to refinance, restructure, amend or otherwise replace the Fashion Show/Palazzo Loans, 2006 Credit Facility, Secured Portfolio Facility, other mortgage loans maturing in 2009 and the unsecured bonds issued by TRCLP which are due in 2009.

Our liquidity is also dependent on cash flows from operations, which are affected by the severe weakening of the economy. The downturn in the domestic retail market has resulted in reduced tenant sales and increased tenant bankruptcies, which in turn affects our ability to generate rental revenue. In addition, the rapid and deep deterioration of the housing market, with new housing starts currently at a fifty year low, negatively affects our ability to generate income through the sale of residential land in our master planned communities.

We have undertaken a comprehensive examination of all of the financial and strategic alternatives to generate capital from a variety of sources, including, but not limited to, both core and non-core asset sales, the sale of joint venture interests, a corporate level capital infusion, and/or strategic business combinations. Given the continued weakness of the retail and credit markets, there can be no assurance that we can obtain further extensions or refinance our existing debt or obtain the additional capital necessary to satisfy our short term cash needs. In the event that we are unable to extend or refinance our debt or obtain additional capital on a timely basis, we will be required to take further steps to acquire the funds necessary to satisfy our short term cash needs, including seeking legal protection from our creditors. Our potential inability to address our past due and future debt maturities raise substantial doubts as to our ability to continue as a going concern. The accompanying consolidated financial statements have been prepared in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America applicable to a going concern, which contemplates the realization of assets and the satisfaction of liabilities in the normal course of business. Accordingly, our consolidated financial statements do not reflect any adjustments related to the recoverability of assets and satisfaction of liabilities that might be necessary should we be unable to continue as a going concern.

So, we know the reason they have not been forced into bankruptcy, the $595 million due March 15 and the $2.25 billion that was due 12/31/2008 is all non-recourse to GGP. For the remained of 2009, there is $1.6 billion due that is tied to property mortgages.

So, GGP is sitting there in this filing saying they are preparing a bankruptcy filing essentially “unless you refinance or convert” your debt.

Let’s not forget that Citigroup (C), a major lender of GGP also owns 5% of the equity (this is a recent position). We have a company looking at its lenders saying we’re going to file and lenders saying we do not want to refi the debt and deep down you do not want to go Chapter 11.

Why don’t the banks want to refi and see a Chapter 11? Look at housing. The last think banks want to have is impaired commercial loans on one of the nation’s largest REIT’s. Any impairments on these loans would the cause “mark to market” write-downs on their whole portfolio’s. Bad news…

So, what will happen. The best solution would be for debtors to convert to equity outside of Chapter 11. Shareholders get diluted big time but anyone buying shares today already expects that to happen. Even if this does end up in a Chapter 11, my opinion is that this is not a loss for shareholders.

Ultimately this is looking as though March 15 will be a showdown at the OK Coral. Gonna be fun to watch..

FULL 10K

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“Bailouts, Your Dollars, & the Whole Credit Mess"

Ronald H. Muhlenkamp is founder and president of Muhlenkamp & Company, Inc., established in 1977. He is a nationally recognized, award-winning investment manager, frequent guest of the media and featured speaker at investment conferences nationwide. Take your time and go through the presentation. It is worth the read..

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“Bailouts, Your Dollars, & the Whole Credit Mess”

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Friday’s Links

Wall St. Media, NetFlix, Housing, Gphone, Google

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– Thank you for the mention

– Streaming growth is exploding

– Still to high

– Am anxious to see this

Breakup?

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Ackman Going for Target Board Seats $$

Did anyone really think he was just going to go away? Target (TGT) us in for a battle whether they know it or not.

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In a just released 13D/A Filing

As of February 26, 2009, as reflected in this Amendment No. 5, the Reporting Persons are reporting beneficial ownership on an aggregate basis of 58,390,835 shares of Common Stock (approximately 7.8% of the outstanding shares of Common Stock), which include shares of Common Stock and shares subject to certain stock-settled American-style call options. The Reporting Persons also have economic exposure to approximately 1,250,766 notional shares of Common Stock subject to certain cash settled call options, bringing their total economic exposure to 59,641,601 shares of Common Stock (approximately 7.9% of the outstanding shares of Common Stock).

Item 4. Purpose of Transaction.

Item 4 of the Schedule 13D is hereby amended and restated in its entirety, as follows:

The Reporting Persons hold Common Stock and options for investment purposes. The Reporting Persons continue to believe in their fundamental investment case for Target, and that the Company’s Common Stock is undervalued at current market prices.

Representatives of the Reporting Persons have met and may in the future meet with management and/or representatives of the Issuer to engage in discussions that may include matters relating to the strategy, business, assets, operations, governance, management, capital structure, financial condition and/or future plans of the Issuer in an effort to enhance shareholder value. The Reporting Persons have engaged, and may engage additional, advisors to assist it, including consultants, accountants, attorneys, financial advisors or others, and may contact other shareholders of the Issuer and/or other relevant parties to discuss any and all of the above.

Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the Reporting Persons are currently engaged in discussions with the Issuer regarding the consideration by the Board of Directors of the Issuer of certain candidates proposed by the Reporting Persons as directors of the Issuer.

Depending on various factors, including, without limitation, the Issuer’s financial position and strategic direction, the outcome of discussions referenced above, actions taken by the Issuer, and trading price levels of the Common Stock, the Reporting Persons may in the future take such actions with respect to their investments in the Issuer as they deem appropriate including, without limitation, purchasing additional shares of Common Stock or related financial instruments or selling some or all of their respective beneficial and economic holdings, engaging in any hedging or similar transaction with respect to such holdings and/or otherwise changing their intention with respect to any and all matters referred to in paragraphs (a) through (j) of Item 4 of Schedule 13D. The Reporting Persons may change their beneficial or economic holdings depending on additions or redemptions of capital. The Reporting Persons’ are in the business of trading — buying and selling — securities and other financial instruments. Consequently, the Reporting Persons’ beneficial ownership as reported on this Schedule 13D will vary over time depending on various factors, with or without regard to the Reporting Persons’ views of the Issuer’s business, prospects or valuation (including the market price of Common Stock), including without limitation, other investment opportunities available to the Reporting Persons, concentration of positions in the portfolios managed by the Reporting Persons, conditions in the securities market and general economic and industry conditions.

Disclosure (“none” means no position):Rooting for Ackman

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Sears Holding’s Edward Lampert’s Letter to Shareholders $$

This is a fascinating letter. Lampert addresses “mark-to-market”, short sellers, regulation, Lehman, Bear Sterns, AIG, Banks, the Austrian School ,Hyaek and more. He also addresses critics who chastised him for not spending more as today competitors liquidate, drastically cut back plans and he sits on $1.3 billion in cash.

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Latest 8K

Edward Lampert’s Letter to Shareholders 2/2009

Publish at Scribd or explore others: Other Business & Legal sears holdings edwar

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Here It Is… The Proposed.2010 Federal Budget

Read it and weep…..

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Obama’s Budget

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Time to Find Some "Religion"? $$

Stumbled across this yesterday and the more I look at it, the more I like it.

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If I told you I had a company you could by a pieces of for 7 times earnings that was growing EPS >50% a year, would you be interested? Me too..

True Religion Apparel, Inc. (True Religion) designs, markets, distributes, and sells apparel under the brand name True Religion Brand Jeans to consumers in more than 50 countries on six continents: North and South America, Asia, Africa, Europe and Australia. The Company’s products are sold in the United States in national premium stores, including Bloomingdale’s, Neiman Marcus, Nordstrom, Saks Fifth Avenue, and in over 2,000 boutique and specialty stores. Its products can be categorized as denim, knit and non-denim, and most come in tops and bottoms. Knit styles include hoodies, t-shirts and sweats, and non-denim fabrics include corduroy and twill. The Company sells men’s women’s and kid’s styles for its products. True Religion operates in four segments: United States Wholesale, International Wholesale, Consumer Direct and Corporate, which includes licensing activity.

Here is a look at earnings since inception:

Now, the argument against the company would be: “In a recession. who will spend $200 for a pair of jeans?” Valid point. Let’s look at the jean market.

Who is their customer?:

Looking forward:

Think of True Religion and their product a bit like Starbucks (SBUX). They have a similar demographic. The difference is that True is not trying to sell their products through 14,000 locations. While Starbucks is finding that a large percentage of the millions of customers they need to serve in order to grow have become very price conscious, True is still small enough that there is plenty of folks who will spend $200 on jeans at the 42 locations they currently have. This will not avoid a slowdown but will buffer them against deterioration.

Why the discount then?

Due to the recession, for fiscal 2009 selling jeans in specialty boutiques and major department stores such as Saks (SKS) and Nordstrom Inc (JWN), expects to earn between $1.73 and $1.81 a share (essentially flat over 2008) on revenue between $290 million and $297 million (vs $273 in 2008). Dept. store sales are expected t fall 17% to 19%. Still, at $11 a share, that means at the low end you are paying 6.3 times 2009 earnings for shares.

Key assumptions embedded in the Company’s full year 2009 guidance, as compared to the full year 2008, are identified below:

· Forecasted net sales growth within the Company’s consumer direct segment of 60% to 65% will be driven by the addition of 25 new branded retail stores in 2009 and the 27 stores opened in 2008.
· Net sales in the U.S. wholesale segment is expected to decline by 17% to 19% driven by a sharp reduction in sales to boutiques and a mid-single digit decline in sales to Majors and off-price retailers.
· The Company’s International segment is forecasted to increase its net sales by low single digits, driven by an increase in net sales to Japanese wholesale customers.

What does it all mean? True gives up plenty of downside protection. With $57 million in the bank, True provides investors with $2.38 a share in cash on the books. This means 22% of the share price is just the cash in the bank. What about debt you say? There is none. The cash is free and clear.

At its current market cap, True is valued at just under 1 times 2009 sales and just over 1 times 2008’s. Too low.

What if the recession deepens and profits actually fall? Say they fall 10%? Will the stock then trade for 5 times those earnings? Or is it likely the current price reflects a general feeling profits may fall more than currently projected and any shortfall in results will be met with a stagnant share price? Who knows but my impression is that the latter is most likely.

Think about it. If you owned the company outright and someone offered you $8.62 for it ($11 share price – the $2.38 per share you have in the company’s bank account) would you take it or tell the potential buyer where to stick it? Me too. Now reverse it. If someone owned it and offered the company for $11 and included in the price was the $2.38 in the bank would you jumo at it? Me too.

That is essentially what is happening right now with the share price. Should you rush out and buy shares? No. I’m not but they are high up on the watch list. I want a bit more clarity on the macro environment before I buy. This isn’t to say I see shares cratering anytime soon, just that they could remain flat as the economy sours more.  Should the maco environment show no visibilty as the year progresses, one would assume True shares mirror that. 

But, as soon as I see strength in the macro condition, assuming I have not missed a huge run up, if shares sit near where they are now they would be almost irresistable…

It would be a “sin” not to buy them in that case….Sorry, had to do it…

Most recent 8K

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Thursday’s Links

The Administration, Chicago Tea Party, Dodd, Robin Hood

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– So, they don’t pay taxes and don’t pay their bills……nice

– Check it out here

Ouch

– Don’t trust him
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AutoNation 10-K & ESL

There is a very interesting sentence in there about ESL and Eddie Lampert.

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The applicable sentence is highlighted by me below…

From the 10-K

In January 2009, our Board of Directors authorized and approved letter agreements with certain automotive manufacturers in order to, among other things, eliminate any potential adverse consequences under our framework agreements with those manufacturers in the event that ESL Investments, Inc. and certain of its investment affiliates (together, “ESL”) acquires 50% or more of our common stock. The letter agreements with American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Honda”) and Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (“Toyota”) also contain governance-related and other provisions as described below. Also a party to both the Honda and Toyota Agreements is ESL, our largest shareholder. As of February 6, 2009, ESL beneficially owned approximately 45% of the outstanding shares of our common stock.

Under the terms of the Honda Agreement, Honda has agreed not to assert its right to purchase our Honda and Acura franchises and/or similar remedies under the manufacturer framework agreement between Honda and the Company in the event that ESL acquires 50% or more of our common stock. If ESL acquires more than 50% of our common stock, ESL has agreed to vote all shares in excess of 50% in the same proportion as all non-ESL-owned shares are voted. In addition, we have agreed to ensure that a majority of our Board is independent of both the Company and ESL under existing New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) listing standards. Furthermore, the Honda Agreement provides that Honda’s consent does not apply to a “going private” transaction under Rule 13e-3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The terms and conditions of the Honda Agreement will only apply at such time and for so long as ESL owns more than 50% of our common stock.

Under the terms of the Toyota Agreement, Toyota has agreed not to assert its right to purchase our Toyota and Lexus franchises and/or similar remedies under the manufacturer framework agreement between Toyota and the Company in the event that ESL acquires 50% or more of our common stock. If ESL acquires more than 50% of our common stock, ESL has agreed to vote all shares in excess of 50% in the same proportion as all non-ESL-owned shares are voted. Furthermore, we have agreed that a majority of our Board will be independent from both the Company and from ESL under existing NYSE listing standards. We have also agreed not to merge, consolidate, or combine with any entity owned or controlled by ESL unless Toyota consents thereto. In addition, the Toyota Agreement provides that in the event that we appoint a Chief Operating Officer who, in the good faith judgment of our Board, does not have sufficient breadth and depth of experience, a relevant, successful automotive track record, and extensive successful automotive experience, ESL shall be required to divest its shares in excess of 50% within nine (9) months or its voting interest will be limited to 25%, and if ESL does not divest such shares within eighteen (18) months, it will lose all voting rights until it divests such shares. The terms and conditions of the Toyota Agreement will only apply at such time and for so long as ESL owns more than 50% of our common stock and will terminate on December 31, 2009 with respect to future stock acquisitions by ESL, provided that ESL may seek successive annual one-year extensions, and Toyota may not unreasonably withhold or delay its consent thereto.

In connection with the Toyota and Honda agreements described above, in January 2009, our Board authorized and approved a separate letter agreement between the Company and ESL in which ESL has agreed to vote shares of our common stock owned by ESL in excess of 45% in the same proportion as all non-ESL-owned shares are voted. The ESL Agreement expires on January 28, 2010, unless extended by mutual agreement of the parties.

This is the first time I have seen in a filing the thought that AutoNation may be “merged with another entity”. hmmmmmm

Readers here know that for a while now I have thought Lampert’s end game is an AutoNation (AN), Sears Holdings (SHLD) and AutoZone (AZO). The reason can be found here.

Share Repurchases:
On October 23, 2007, our Board of Directors approved a share repurchase program (the “Share Repurchase Program”), which authorized AutoNation to repurchase up to $250 million in shares of our common stock. The Share Repurchase Program does not have an expiration date. During the fourth quarter of 2008, we did not repurchase any shares of our common stock. As of December 31, 2008, up to $142.7 million in shares may yet be repurchased under the Share Repurchase Program.

Sales:
Interesting statistic. Luxury sales were down 16% vs 29% for domestic for the company. In 1999, AN was 70% domestic 30% import/luxury. In 2009 those numbers will be almost 80% import/luxury vs just over 20% domestic.

Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long AN

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"Mark to Market" ….

Still more on the subject. Lost in the debate is those of us who want alterations to the policy, so not want it eliminated, just adjusted. There are options that would better reflect the value of these securities.

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Brian Wesbury on the subject:

Past posts on “mark to market

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