## An Analysis of Berkshire Hathaway

## T2 Partners LLC

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## Berkshire Hathaway: A High-Quality, Rapidly Growing 75-Cent Dollar

## History

- Berkshire Hathaway today does not resemble the company that Buffett bought into during the 1960s
- Berkshire was a leading New England-based textile company, with investment appeal as a classic Ben Graham-style "net-net"
- Buffett took control of Berkshire on May 10, 1965
- At that time, Berkshire had a market value of about $\$ 18$ million and shareholder's equity of about $\$ 22$ million


## The Berkshire Hathaway Empire Today

## GEICO

## Gen Re FlightSafety

## See's. CANDIES

Fine fowelry and Gifis A Berkshire Hathaway Company

## Stakes in Public Companies Worth \$1+ Billion

| Company | Shares | $\underline{\text { Price }}$ | Value (\$B) |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Coca-Cola | 200.0 | $\$ 54.51$ | $\$ 10.9$ |
| Wells Fargo | 313.4 | $\$ 28.20$ | $\$ 8.8$ |
| Burlington Northern Santa F | 76.8 | $\$ 99.50$ | $\$ 7.6$ |
| American Express | 151.6 | $\$ 38.67$ | $\$ 5.9$ |
| Procter \& Gamble | 96.3 | $\$ 60.81$ | $\$ 5.9$ |
| Kraft | 138.3 | $\$ 28.35$ | $\$ 3.9$ |
| ConocoPhillips | 57.4 | $\$ 49.81$ | $\$ 2.9$ |
| Johnson \& Johnson | 36.9 | $\$ 63.44$ | $\$ 2.3$ |
| Wal-Mart | 37.8 | $\$ 53.40$ | $\$ 2.0$ |
| U.S. Bancorp | 69.0 | $\$ 25.12$ | $\$ 1.7$ |

Note: Stock prices as of 1/27/10; excl. GE, Goldman \& Wesco

## Garanimals

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FRUITTitiLOOM. AimeLane

## $\boldsymbol{J}_{M}$ Johns Manville

KIREY (1)
GINSU


ACME BRICK

## The Basics

- Stock price (1/27/10): $\$ 107,000$
- \$71.36 for B shares (equivalent to $\$ 107,040 / \mathrm{A}$ share)
- Shares outstanding: 1.55 million
- Market cap: $\$ 166$ billion
- Total assets (Q3 ‘09): \$292 billion
- Total equity (Q3 ‘09): $\$ 131$ billion
- Book value per share (Q3 ‘09): \$81,247


## Recent Performance of Key Business Units

## Earnings Before Taxes and Minority Interests, By Year:

|  | $\underline{2004}$ | $\underline{2005}$ | $\underline{2006}$ | $\underline{2007}$ | $\underline{2008}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Insurance Group: |  |  |  |  |  |
| GEICO | 970 | 1,221 | 1,314 | 1,113 | 916 |
| General Re | 3 | -334 | 523 | 555 | 342 |
| Berkshire Reinsurance Group | 417 | -1,069 | 1,658 | 1,427 | 1,324 |
| Berkshire H. Primary Group | 161 | 235 | 340 | 279 | 210 |
| Investment Income | 2,824 | 3,480 | 4,316 | 4,758 | 4,722 |
| Total Insurance Oper. Inc. | 4,375 | 3,533 | 8,151 | 8,132 | 7,514 |
| Non-Insurance Businesses: |  |  |  |  |  |
| Finance and Financial products | 584 | 822 | 1,157 | 1,006 | 787 |
| Marmon |  |  |  |  | 733 |
| McLane Company | 228 | 217 | 229 | 232 | 276 |
| MidAmerican/Utilities/Energy | 237 | 523 | 1,476 | 1,774 | 2,963 |
| Shaw Industries | 466 | 485 | 594 | 436 | 205 |
| Other businesses | 1,787 | 1,921 | 2,703 | 3,279 | 2,809 |
| Total Non-Insur. Oper. Inc. | 3,302 | 3,968 | 6,159 | 6,727 | 7,773 |
| Total Operating Income | 7,677 | 7,501 | 14,310 | 14,859 | 15,287 |

## Recent Performance of Key Business Units

## Earnings Before Taxes and Minority Interests, By Quarter:

|  | Q1 05 | Q2 05 | Q3 05 | Q4 05 | Q1 06 | Q2 06 | Q3 06 | Q4 06 | Q1 07 | Q2 07 | Q3 07 | Q4 07 | Q1 08 | Q2 08 | Q3 08 | Q4 08 | Q1 09 | Q2 09 | Q3 09 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Insurance Group: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GEICO | 312 | 358 | 237 | 314 | 311 | 288 | 407 | 308 | 295 | 325 | 335 | 158 | 186 | 298 | 246 | 186 | 148 | 111 | 200 |
| General Re | 19 | 43 | -389 | -7 | 71 | 106 | 177 | 169 | 30 | 230 | 157 | 138 | 42 | 102 | 54 | 144 | -16 | 276 | 186 |
| Berkshire Reinsurance Group | 143 | 140 | -1,635 | 283 | 94 | 137 | 735 | 692 | 553 | 356 | 183 | 335 | 29 | 79 | -166 | 1,382 | 203 | -291 | 167 |
| Berkshire H. Primary Group | 18 | 37 | -10 | 190 | 35 | 43 | 108 | 154 | 49 | 63 | 77 | 90 | 25 | 81 | -8 | 112 | 4 | 29 | 7 |
| Investment Income | 787 | 851 | $\underline{900}$ | 942 | 1,018 | 1,102 | 1,103 | 1,093 | 1,078 | 1,236 | 1,217 | 1,227 | 1,089 | 1,204 | 1,074 | 1,355 | 1,298 | 1,422 | 1,348 |
| Total Insurance Oper. Inc. | 1,279 | 1,429 | -897 | 1,722 | 1,529 | 1,676 | 2,530 | 2,416 | 2,005 | 2,210 | 1,969 | 1,948 | 1,371 | 1,764 | 1,200 | 3,179 | 1,637 | 1,547 | 1,908 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-Insurance Businesses: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Finance and Financial products | 199 | 199 | 207 | 217 | 251 | 343 | 282 | 281 | 242 | 277 | 273 | 214 | 241 | 254 | 163 | 129 | 127 | 135 | 142 |
| Marmon |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 28 | 261 | 247 | 197 | 162 | 170 | 194 |
| McLane Company | 69 | 59 | 53 | 36 | 55 | 56 | 50 | 68 | 58 | 72 | 50 | 52 | 73 | 68 | 68 | 67 | 143 | 66 | 64 |
| MidAmerican/Utilities/Energy | 141 | 100 | 141 | 141 | 418 | 278 | 416 | 364 | 513 | 372 | 481 | 408 | 516 | 329 | 526 | 1,592 | 303 | 402 | 441 |
| Shaw Industries | 88 | 139 | 145 | 113 | 155 | 169 | 138 | 132 | 91 | 111 | 125 | 109 | 51 | 82 | 49 | 23 | 55 | 30 | 51 |
| Other businesses | 364 | $\underline{514}$ | 486 | $\underline{557}$ | 430 | $\underline{671}$ | 686 | $\underline{916}$ | $\underline{632}$ | $\underline{904}$ | 895 | 848 | 693 | 874 | 749 | 493 | 151 | 171 | 299 |
| Total Non-Insur. Oper. Inc. | 861 | 1,011 | 1,032 | 1,064 | 1,309 | 1,517 | 1,572 | 1,761 | 1,536 | 1,736 | 1,824 | 1,631 | 1,602 | 1,868 | 1,802 | 2,501 | 941 | 974 | 1,191 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total Operating Income | 2,140 | 2,440 | 135 | 2,786 | 2,838 | 3,193 | 4,102 | 4,177 | 3,541 | 3,946 | 3,793 | 3,579 | 2,973 | 3,632 | 3,002 | 5,680 | 2,578 | 2,521 | 3,099 |

# The Earnings of Berkshire's Operating Businesses Have Grown at a Very High Rate - And Growth is Accelerating 

|  | Per-Share <br> Year | Per-Share <br> Investments | CAGR |  | Pre-Tax Earnings <br> Pr |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\$ 4$ |  | CAGR |  |  |
| 1979 | $\$ 577$ | $42.8 \%$ | $\$ 4$ |  |  |
| 1993 | $\$ 13,961$ | $25.6 \%$ | $\$ 212$ | $11.1 \%$ |  |
| 2008 | $\$ 77,793$ | $12.1 \%$ | $\$ 3,921$ | $19.1 \%$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Berkshire is becoming less of an investment company and more of an operating business.

## Growth in Earnings of Berkshire's Operating Businesses Has Slowed as Buffett Has Allocated More Capital to Investments in Recent Years

Note: List of 25 largest companies (by market cap) that trades on U.S. exchanges
Source: Capital IQ, through 1/6/09

| Company Name |  | \% Growth <br> Rate* |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Exxon Mobil | Market Cap <br>  <br> Wal-Mart | $\$ 408,458$ |
| Procter \& Gamble | $\$ 219,741$ | 24 |
| Microsoft | $\$ 185,621$ | 10 |
| General Electric | $\$ 184,672$ | 18 |
| AT\&T | $\$ 177,404$ | 8 |
| Johnson \& Johnson | $\$ 166,772$ | 26 |
| Chevron | $\$ 165,614$ | 9 |
| Berkshire Hathaway | $\$ 157,159$ | 27 |
| Pfizer | $\$ 154,573$ | 14 |
| IBM | $\$ 120,024$ | 6 |
| Cisco Systems | $\$ 119,877$ | 9 |
| Coca-Cola | $\$ 104,162$ | 13 |
| Google | $\$ 103,439$ | 9 |
| Hewlett-Packard | $\$ 102,180$ | $n / a$ |
| Oracle | $\$ 94,981$ | 22 |
| Verizon | $\$ 92,799$ | 19 |
| Genentech | $\$ 90,782$ | 3 |
| Pepsico | $\$ 88,371$ | 48 |
| Intel | $\$ 86,509$ | 11 |
| ConocoPhillips | $\$ 85,488$ | 11 |
| Apple | $\$ 83,009$ | 28 |
| Abbott Labs | $\$ 82,689$ | 202 |
| McDonald's | $\$ 79,007$ | 9 |
| Amgen | $\$ 69,258$ | 16 |
| Median | $\$ 61,813$ | 14 |

> * 5-year compound annual growth rate of EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) through Q3 07. Berkshire's figure is pre-tax EPS excluding all income from investments.

## The Burlington Northern Acquisition Dwarfs Anything Before It



- He's doing a good job - but the cash is coming in so fast!
- A high-class problem
- Markets have a way of presenting big opportunities on short notice
- Current chaos, junk bonds in 2002
- Buffett has reduced average maturity of bond portfolio so he can act quickly


## A Breakdown of Berkshire's Capital Commitments in 2008

| Investment/Commitment | Amount (Bn) | Comment |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Mars/Wrigley | \$6.5 |  |
| Auction rate securities | \$6.5 | Q2 event; sold much in Q3 |
| Goldman Sachs | \$5.0 | Plus \$5B to exercise warrants |
| Constellation Energy stock and preferred | \$5.7 | Sold for a \$1.1B gain incl. breakup fee |
| Marmon | \$4.5 | The remaining 34.6\% not owned by BRK will be purchased from 2011-14 |
| General stock purchases | \$3.3 | Full year; net of sales |
| Dow/Rohm \& Haas | \$3.0 |  |
| General Electric | \$3.0 | Plus \$3B to exercise warrants |
| Fed. Home Loan Disc. Notes | \$2.4 | Q2 event; sold much in Q3 |
| Tungaloy | \$1.0 | Iscar acquisition |
| Swiss Re unit | \$0.8 | Plus sharing agreement |
| ING reinsurance unit | \$0.4 |  |
| Other businesses purchased | \$3.9 |  |
| TOTAL | \$46.0 | Plus \$8B to exercise GS \& GE warrants |

## Valuing Berkshire

"Over the years we've...attempt[ed] to increase our marketable investments in wonderful businesses, while simultaneously trying to buy similar businesses in their entirety." - 1995 Annual Letter
"In our last two annual reports, we furnished you a table that Charlie and I believe is central to estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key components of value. The first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments, but after all interest and corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the first column." - 1997 Annual Letter

|  |  | Pre-tax Earnings Per Share |
| ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Year | Investments |  |
| Per Share | Investments |  |

1967
1977
1987
1997
\$ 41
$\$ \quad 1.09$
12.44

1987
3,910
108.14

1997
38,043
717.82
"In effect, the columns show what Berkshire would look like were it split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate costs." - 1997 Annual Letter

## Buffett's Comments on Berkshire's Valuation Lead to an Implied Multiplier of Approximately 12

| Year | Investments Per Share | Pre-tax EPS <br> Excluding All Income From Investments | Year-End <br> Stock <br> Price | Intrinsic Value | Implied Multiplier |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1996 | \$28,500 | \$421 | \$34,100 | \$34,100 | 13 |
| 1997 | \$38,043 | \$718 | \$46,000 | \$46,000 | 11 |
| 1998 | \$47,647 | \$474 | \$70,000 | \$54,000 | 13 |
| 1999 | \$47,339 | -\$458 | \$56,100 | \$60,000 |  |

- 1996 Annual Letter: "Today's price/value relationship is both much different from what it was a year ago and, as Charlie and I see it, more appropriate."
- 1997 Annual Letter: "Berkshire's intrinsic value grew at nearly the same pace as book value" (book +34.1\%)
- 1998 Annual Letter: "Though Berkshire's intrinsic value grew very substantially in 1998, the gain fell well short of the $48.3 \%$ recorded for book value." (Assume a 15$20 \%$ increase in intrinsic value.)
- 1999 Annual Letter: "A repurchase of, say, 2\% of a company's shares at a 25\% discount from per-share intrinsic value...We will not repurchase shares unless we believe Berkshire stock is selling well below intrinsic value, conservatively calculated...Recently, when the A shares fell below $\$ 45,000$, we considered making repurchases."


## Estimating Berkshire's Value: 2001-2009

|  |  | Pre-tax EPS |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Excluding All |  | Subsequent |
|  | Investments | Income From | Intrinsic Value | Year Stock |
| Year End | Per Share | Investments | Per Share | Price Range |
| 2001 | \$47,460 | -\$1,289 | \$64,000 | \$59,600-\$78,500 |
| 2002 | \$52,507 | \$1,479 | \$70,000 | \$60,600-\$84,700 |
| 2003 | \$62,273 | \$2,912 | \$97,000 | \$81,000-\$95,700 |
| 2004 | \$66,967 | \$3,003 | \$103,000 | \$78,800-\$92,000 |
| 2005 | \$74,129 | \$3,600 | \$117,300 | \$85,700-\$114,200 |
| 2006 | \$80,636 | \$5,200-\$5,400 ${ }^{2}$ | \$143,000-\$144,400 | \$107,200-\$151,650 |
| 2007 | \$90,343 | \$5,500-\$5,700 ${ }^{3}$ | \$156,300-\$158,700 | \$84,000-\$147,000 |
| 2008 | \$77,793 | \$5,728 | ,\$123,617 (8 multiple) | \$70,050-\$108,100 |
| 2009 (est.) | \$92,500 | $\$ 5,000^{4}$ | $\$ 142,500 \text { (10 multiple) }$ | ? |

Given compressed multiples at the end of 2008 , we used an 8 rather than a 12 multiple.
We bumped this to a 10 multiple at the end of 2009, still below the 12 multiple we believe Buffett uses.

1. Unlike Buffett, we include earnings from Berkshire's insurance businesses.
2. Actual result was $\$ 6,492$, but we reduce this to assume the $2^{\text {nd }}$-worst year ever for super-cat losses.
3. Actual result was $\$ 6,270$ but we reduce the pre-tax, pre-investment-income margins of the insurance businesses by 400 basis points (from 14\% to 10\%) to reflect Buffett's guidance in the Annual Report.
4. We have trimmed our estimate of normalized earnings to reflect the weak economy.

## Even Using an 10 Multiple, Berkshire Is Approximately 25\% Below Intrinsic Value



* Investments per share plus $12 x$ pre-tax earnings per share (excluding all income from investments) for the prior year,


## 12-Month Investment Return

- Current intrinsic value: $\$ 142,500 /$ share
- Plus 5\% growth of intrinsic value of the business
- Plus cash build over next 12 months: \$4,000/share
- Equals intrinsic value in one year of $\$ 153,600$
- $44 \%$ above today's price


## Catalysts

- Continued earnings growth of operating businesses
- New equity investments
- Additional cash build
- Moody's restores AAA rating (not likely in the near term)
- Potential for more meaningful acquisitions and investments
- If there's a double-dip recession, this becomes more likely


## Risks

- A double-dip recession impacts Berkshire's earnings materially
- Berkshire's stock portfolio declines
- Investments in GE, Goldman and others turn out badly
- Losses in the shorter-duration derivatives such as credit-default swaps are larger than expected and/or mark-to-market losses mount among the equity index puts
- A major super-cat event occurs that costs Berkshire many billions
- Berkshire is downgraded further
- No catalyst occurs, so the stock sits there and doesn't go up
- Intrinsic value will likely continue to grow nicely
- Something happens to Buffett
- In good health; turned 79 last Aug. 30th
- Strong board and succession plan in place
- Little Buffett premium in stock today


## Conclusion

- Cheap stock: 75-cent dollar, giving no value to recent investments and immense optionality
- Extremely safe: huge cash and other assets provide downside protection

