Freedom of Speech, Rumors, Prediction, 2003, S&P PE
– Why isn’t anyone talking about this?
– If they come true, are they rumors?
– Is the recession already price in?
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Month: October 2008
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Lampert Buying More AutoZone
Been a while but you had to figure if the market tanked, Sears’ (SHLD) Eddie Lampert would be there buying.
Lampert and ESL Investments added another 165k shares in AutoZone (AZO).
Lampert paid between $95.50 and $103 a share.
He now holds almost 24 million shares.
Here is some background on the recent agreement between Lampert and AutoZone regarding his ownership.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long SHLD, none
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Anyone who has been an even semi-regular reader knows what a fan of Wilbur Ross we are here. Wilbur has been spot on in regards to the current crisis. Both in leading up to it and what has happened during it.
Ross is looking at companies that are commodity based that are going to profit from the fall in those prices (although he says oil will not go below $70). Specifically he mentioned carbon based chemical companies (Dow Chemical (DOW)?). He also is continuing to buy mortgage servicing companies. He is buying more shares of many of the companies he already owns ad many trade 505 below recent prices and that there is “nothing fundamentally wrong with them”.
Stimulus checks???”A terrible waste, only about 30% of the last batch got spent”
Watch the video…..there is a commercial in the middle and the interview picks up after it.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):
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Check this out from the JP Morgan (JPM) earnings call
In response to a question on tightening lending standards:
“People have gone back to old-fashioned 80 percent L.T.V. (loan to value). Real verified income. More disciplined appraisals. And in some areas, we won’t even go to 80 percent L.T.V. because of expected home decreases. We are not at 80 percent in California, Nevada and Florida — we are at 65 percent.”
The loan-to-value is simply value of an asset to the amount of the loan given out by banks. So, if Joe wants buy a house for $200,000, an $160,000 mortgage would equate to 80 percent L.T.V. ratio. Under some of the newer standards in the above mentioned states, Joe would only be able to get a loan for $130,000 and would have to come up with $70,000 himself.
At the height of housing euphoria, some banks were giving loans with an L.T.V. of 105 percent to customers, meaning the loan covered the entire price of the asset — plus more, to cover closing costs. In this scenario, Joe would walk up and sign and be given the keys without a dime coming out of his pocket…
Any wonder we are where we are??? More later..
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Wells Fargo Forced Into TARP Plan
I can’t get behind a plan that forced private companies to make the gov’t a partner when they actually do not need it….Remember, this is just weeks after had said that injecting capital directly into banks would appear to be a sign of “failure.”
From the WSJ:\
During the discussion, the most animated response came from Wells Fargo (WFC) Chairman Richard Kovacevich, say people present. Why was this necessary? he asked. Why did the government need to buy stakes in these banks?
Morgan Stanley (MS) Chief Executive John Mack, whose company was among the most vulnerable in the group to the swirling financial crisis, quickly signed.
Bank of America’s (BAC) Kenneth Lewis acknowledged the obvious, that everyone at the table would participate. “Any one of us who doesn’t have a healthy fear of the unknown isn’t paying attention,” he said.
It continues:
Mr. Paulson said the public had lost confidence in the banking system. “The system needs more money, and all of you will be better off if there’s more capital in the system,” Mr. Paulson told the bankers.
After Mr. Kovacevich voiced his concerns, Mr. Paulson described the deal starkly. He told the Wells Fargo chairman he could accept the government’s money or risk going without the infusion. If the company found it needed capital later and Mr. Kovacevich couldn’t raise money privately, Mr. Paulson promised the government wouldn’t be so generous the second time around.
Essentially this is like Don Corleone “making the banks an offer they can’t refuse”. The message was “make me your partner now, if you don’t and need me down the road, we will crush you”.
I can’t get behind this and shame on both Barack Obama and John McCain for for blessing it based on a 1 day stock market reaction. Their blanket acceptance of it means that one not ought to expect significant improvement when either takes office. Remember, they both backed the previous plan also. These plan are polar opposites of each other, I would think one ought to have a preference.
Now, are there bank who this will save? Yes. Are there bank for whom this is necessary? Yes. They ought to have access to it. But to in no uncertain terms should they threaten a bank (Wells Fargo) that just took the gov’t off the hook for Wachovia (WB) with what, based on all accounts, was a AIG (AIG) action should their help be needed down to road, is wrong.
Let’s not forget that that the people running the show in Washington (both parties) ran Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE), both of whom are at the epicenter of this whole mess. I am hesitant to say they know what is best.
We keep hearing that the “world is flush with liquidity”. So, if that is actually true, why hasn’t it worked so far? It isn’t a question of needing more. It is the fear of the unknown that is seizing markets. Giving banks more money does not eliminate these fears. What is does do is let them sit back more comfortably. Now, if your goal is to just allow them to feel good, then this will work.
But, if your goal is to have them go out and lend and take a certain level of risk, it won’t. The current environment is too risk adverse. If you want that behavior, then you must reduce the fear of the unknown by removing as much if it as possible.
Then, the banks will begin to loan again…
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long WFC, none
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Nassim Nicholas Taleb Vents….
“Black Swan” author Taleb has been trying for years to get people to listen…can’t blame him from being frustrated. Folks still are not listening.
You must read his book:
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JP Morgan & Wells Fargo Defy Analysts
Both JP Morgan (JPM) and Wells Fargo (WFC) lapped earnings estimates this morning.
Here are the pre-earnings predictions
Wells Fargo Reported:
— Strong business momentum continues:
— Year-to-date revenue up 11 percent
— Average loans up 15 percent from prior year and 13 percent (annualized) from prior quarter
— Average earning assets up 15 percent from prior year and 13 percent (annualized) from prior quarter
— Core deposits up 10 percent from September 30, 2007, and 30 percent (annualized) from June 30, 2008
— Cross-sell of 6.3 for wholesale customers and a record 5.7 for retail bank households
— Credit reserve build of $500 million ($0.10 per share), bringing allowance for credit losses to $8.0 billion
— Previously announced impairment charges for investments in Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Lehman Brothers totaling $646 million ($0.13 per share)
— Revenue up 5 percent from prior year despite impact of investment write-downs
— Tier 1 capital of 8.58 percent, up from 8.24 percent in second quarter 2008
Regarding deposits:
“We saw a tremendous inflow of deposits in the latter part of the quarter, especially at the end of September reflecting what we believe is a significant flight to quality,” said Chief Financial Officer Howard Atkins. Core deposits increased $23.7 billion, or 30 percent (annualized), from June 30, 2008. Average core deposits of $320.1 billion increased $13.9 billion, or 5 percent, from a year ago and $1.7 billion, or 2 percent (annualized), linked quarter. Average mortgage escrow deposits were $21.2 billion, down $1.2 billion from third quarter 2007 and down $1.5 billion linked quarter. Average retail core deposits increased $13.2 billion, or 6 percent, from third quarter 2007 and increased $3.8 billion, or 7 percent (annualized), linked quarter. Average consumer checking accounts grew a net 6.1 percent from second quarter 2007, with 8 percent growth in California, the largest increase in net new checking accounts in California in almost four years. Wealth Management group average core deposits of $22.7 billion increased $7.7 billion, or 52 percent, from third quarter 2007.
JP Morgan Reported:
* Acquired Washington Mutual’s (WM) banking operations on September 25:
* Significantly strengthened consumer franchise, with more than 5,400 branches
* Results included estimated1 losses of $640 million (after-tax) for Washington Mutual merger-related items: $1.2 billion charge to conform loan loss reserves and a $581 million extraordinary gain
* Reported net markdowns of $3.6 billion due to mortgage-related positions and leveraged lending exposures in the Investment Bank
* Maintained #1 rankings for Global Investment Banking Fees and Global Debt, Equity & Equity-related volumes for the quarter and year to date
* Grew revenue by 16% and increased branch production at Retail Financial Services
* Achieved double-digit net income growth at both Commercial Banking and Treasury & Securities Services
* Reported the following significant after-tax items:
* $927 million benefit from reduced deferred tax liabilities
* $642 million loss on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac preferred securities
* $248 million charge related to offer to repurchase auction-rate securities
* Increased credit reserves by $1.3 billion firmwide to $15.3 billion, resulting in loan loss allowance coverage of 3.18% for consumer businesses and 2.11% for wholesale businesses, before Washington Mutual
* Maintained strong Tier 1 Capital of $112 billion, or 8.9% (estimated); raised $11.5 billion of common equity during the quarter
Regarding Deposits:
# Checking accounts totaled 11.7 million, up 1.0 million, or 10%.
# Average total deposits grew to $210.2 billion, up $4.9 billion, or 2%.
Now, this goes back to my post yesterday on the TARP plan. Money is flowing into the surviving banks at an incredible rate. Those surviving all have strong Tier 1 ratios. The problem they all have is, growing loan losses. Growing loan losses will offset the effect of capital injection from the gov’t. If you remove the bad loans, you get a double boost as incoming deposits are then augmented by loan loss reserves being decreased.
My concern and doubt is just how much this plan will actually increased lending. Until banks see loan losses ebb, the intended lending effect of the TARP plan will be muted at best.
Now, if Treasury follows this will the second tranche of the $700b being used for loan purchases, then you’ve got something as you both raise equity and lower loan losses.
Until details are unveiled, I am skeptical..
Now that does not mean these bank will not make money. On the contrary they are taking in deposits at rock bottom rates and still getting loan payments 4% to 5% higher. There are also fewer fish in the pond.
Morgan and Well will do just fine. Just don’t expect the TARP plan to do wonders for the rest of the economy.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long WFC, none
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Lilliputians struggle
“When the tide laps at Gulliver’s waistline, it usually means the Lilliputians are already 10 feet under”
A quote from an excellent article in the Wall Street Journal yesterday. Predictions that the current crisis is the beginning of the demise of the U.S. was rampant.. then the rest of the world caught our cold.
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Nouriel Roubini on Bloomberg tv.
Link to yesterday’s video.
Nouriel Roubini, the professor who predicted the financial crisis in 2006, said the U.S. will suffer its worst recession in 40 years, causing the rally in the stock market to “sputter.”
“There are significant downside risks still to the market and the economy,” Roubini, 50, a New York University professor of economics, said in an interview with Bloomberg Television. “We’re going to be surprised by the severity of the recession and the severity of the financial losses.”
The economist said the recession will last 18 to 24 months, driving unemployment to 9 percent, and already depressed home prices will fall another 15 percent. The U.S. government will need to double its purchase of bank stakes and force lenders to eliminate dividends to save them from bankruptcy, Roubini added. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said today he plans to use $250 billion of taxpayer funds to purchase equity in thousands of financial firms to halt a credit freeze that threatened to drive companies into bankruptcy and eliminate jobs.
“This will be the first round of recapitalization of the banks,” Roubini said. “The government has to decide to intervene much more directly in the provision of credit and the management of these companies.”
U.S. stocks staged the biggest rally in seven decades yesterday on the government plan to buy stakes in banks and a Federal Reserve-led push to flood the global financial system with dollars. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index rose 12 percent. It gained as much as 4.1 percent and fell as much as 1.1 percent today.
`Really Tanking’
“The stock market is going to stop rallying soon enough when they see the economy is really tanking right now,” Roubini added.
The U.S. unemployment rate stood at a five-year high of 6.1 percent last month. Home prices in 20 U.S. metropolitan areas fell 16 percent in July from a year earlier, the most since records began in 2001, according to the S&P/Case-Shiller home- price index. Bank seizures may push home prices down further, scaring away buyers in coming months, after U.S. foreclosures rose at the fastest rate in almost three decades in the second quarter, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association.
Roubini said total credit losses resulting from the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market will be “closer to $3 trillion,” up from his previous estimate of $1 trillion to $2 trillion. The International Monetary Fund estimated $1.4 trillion on Oct. 7. Financial firms have so far reported $637 billion in losses, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
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Wednesday’s Links
Nobel, America, Bloggers, Marginspan class=”fullpost”>
– OK….just in case the Al Gore Nobel Prize did not denigrate the whole thing enough, this will
– This is great
– Great…
This is the 4th put sale by Berkshire Hathaway’s (BRK.A) Warren Buffett in Burlington Northern (BNI) in a week.
On 10/10 Buffett sold $75 strike puts on 1,217,500 shares that expire 12/12 at a price of $7.094 each.
Buffett is clearly taking advantage of the market volatility and its effect of increases option pricing. The more the market swings in either direction, it increases the prices option buyers must pay. If you are a seller like Buffett, it increase the money you take in relative to the strike price of the option.
SEC FILING
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Schumer’s Op-Ed Off Base……Way Off
Dear Charles, this isn’t the best answer, it was the easiest.
Here is Senator Charles Schumer’s WSJ Op-Ed today.
Here is the key point in it:
The administration’s initial approach to the crisis was to propose buying troubled assets from banks. But direct capital injections into financial institutions — modeled on the Depression-era agency, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) — always offered a far better prospect of success. The RFC provided fresh capital to banks and restored confidence (and lending) to the U.S. banking system, while making a small profit.
I pointed this out on the Senate floor a few days before Mr. Paulson came to Congress to ask for authority to spend as much as $700 billion to buy up troubled assets. Later, Democratic leaders Sen. Chris Dodd, Rep. Barney Frank and I made explicit our desire to make direct infusions of capital a part of the approach to solving the crisis during our negotiations with the Treasury.
The benefits of this approach are clear, which is why so many economists, both liberal and conservative, have embraced it. More than a liquidity problem, today we face a solvency problem. History has shown that under such conditions, the most effective means to restore health to the financial system is large injections of capital — which only the government has the wherewithal to make.
Capital infusions are also far more efficient than purchasing assets. Banks can lend much more if their capital bases are restored, and when they dispose of their troubled assets, private markets, not the government, will fix the price.
There is little question that making the government a major investor in American banks raises thorny questions, especially about the role of the public sector in private markets. So let me be clear — this is a temporary solution to an unprecedented crisis, and the government’s role must be limited.
However, that does not mean the government should simply make investments with no or minimal restrictions. We must operate in the same way any significant investor operates in these situations — when Warren Buffett invested in Goldman Sachs and General Electric in recent weeks, he demanded strict, but not onerous terms. The government must be similarly protective of taxpayer interests, without involving itself in daily operational decision making. I believe there are a series of steps and principles, both carrots and sticks, that must be applied if Treasury embraces this approach.
The government should encourage widespread acceptance of capital injections, and mandate it where there are clear systemic risks.
Direct injections of capital will encourage all institutions to lend again. But because depositors and creditors may interpret an injection of government capital as a sign of weakness, we need to start by persuading a substantial cross section of major banks, even those in relatively good health, to accept capital. Widespread bank participation will reduce the risk that depositors may flee or that other institutions will refuse to do business with banks that accept or request public capital.
So, what about the ratio he talks about….
Here is a good definition of the “Tier 1 Ratio:
The Tier 1 capital ratio is the ratio of a bank’s core equity capital to its total risk-weighted assets. Risk-weighted assets are the total of all assets held by the bank which are weighted for credit risk according to a formula determined by the Regulator (usually the country’s Central Bank). Most central banks follow the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) guidelines in setting formulae for asset risk weights. Assets like cash and coins usually have zero risk weight, while debentures might have a risk weight of 100%.
A good definition of Tier I capital is that it includes equity capital and disclosed reserves, where equity capital includes instruments that can’t be redeemed at the option of the holder (meaning that the owner of the shares cannot decide on his own that he wants to withdraw the money he invested and so cannot leave the bank without the risk coverage). Reserves are, as they are held by the bank, by their nature not an amount of money on which anybody but the bank can have an influence on.
Tier 1 capital is also seen as a metric of a bank’s ability to sustain future losses.
In short, there are two ways to look at it. You either increase the equity portion of the ratio, or reduce the debt. Either improves the ratio. Now, I would argue that just raising the equity portion will not do the trick. Why? Many banks already have capital ratio’s far about the legal limit yet still are not lending. Why? The bad debts they have that still cannot be fully valued are causing the debt portion of the ratio to rise and remain unacceptably unstable.
Adding capital to the banks now does NOT “encourage them to lend”. It does assure they will not fail and does let management know it has ample capital to cover future expected losses. Neither of those “encourages lending”. Rather they encourage management to “sit pat” until they have a handle on losses and things “work themselves out”. This is opposed to them running around searching for capital injections like they are now. Removing the debt would have stabilized (even diminished) loan losses AND freed up currently reserved capital being held to cover anticipated losses. Bank management then assured of its situation, would then have begun lending.
In short, removing the bad debt would have encourage lending.
While Schumer does opportunistically mention he terms Bekshire’s (BRK.A) Warren Buffett got from Goldman Sachs (GS). He also does, I think dishonestly omit Buffett enthusiastically not only supported the original plan (buying of debt), but offered to take 1% of the assets ($7 billion dollars worth). Why? It kept the gov’t out of private business and Warren was more than confident the transaction would be profitable for the tax payers and by default, Berkshire’s shareholders.
Schumer also omits this “capital infusion plan” is essentially what the Japanese did during the 1990’s. What happened? A decade of economic malaise as banks simply sat on the money. Having the gov’t as a partner only encourages the most benign of business practices. These are not conducive to economic growth.
Why wasn’t the debt purchase plan done? Timing. It would have been very difficult and time was a factor. The setting up of auctions and the implementation of it would have been a bureaucratic nightmare. Paulson and Bernanke took the capital infusion option not because it was “the best idea”, but because it was the “best idea we can do today”.
If you read the Treasury’s term sheet and watch the Paulson video here, it is clear that Paulson does not think this idea is the best one, just the one we can do this minute.
Had the market not cratered last week, this plan would not have been unveiled.
The following bank have already agred to the program: Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS), Morgan Stanley (MS), J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (JPM), Bank of America Corp. (BAC), Merrill Lynch (MER), Citigroup Inc. (C), Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC), Bank of New York Mellon (BK), and State Street Corp. (STT).
None of these banks were in danger of being below required capital ratios…
All have uncertain loan losses coming up….they still do…
What this plan did as diminish irrational fear in the market banks were going to fail. You saw that relief in yesterday’s rally. What it will not do is lead them to increase lending dramatically and that will hamper any economic recovery. That is where we sit now
I hope Schumer is as willing in the future to step up and take credit for the economic flaccidity this plan will induce just as eagerly as he was today in standing up to take credit for its implementation.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long WFC, C, GS, none
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Here It Is: The TARP Program
The following bank have already agreed to the program: Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS), Morgan Stanley (MS), J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (JPM), Bank of America Corp. (BAC), Merrill Lynch (MER), Citigroup Inc. (C), Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC), Bank of New York Mellon (BK), and State Street Corp. (STT). Video at end.
October 14, 2008
HP-1207
Treasury Announces TARP Capital Purchase Program Description
Washington- Treasury today announced a voluntary Capital Purchase Program to encourage U.S. financial institutions to build capital to increase the flow of financing to U.S. businesses and consumers and to support the U.S. economy.
Under the program, Treasury will purchase up to $250 billion of senior preferred shares on standardized terms as described in the program’s term sheet. The program will be available to qualifying U.S. controlled banks, savings associations, and certain bank and savings and loan holding companies engaged only in financial activities that elect to participate before 5:00 pm (EDT) on November 14, 2008. Treasury will determine eligibility and allocations for interested parties after consultation with the appropriate federal banking agency.
The minimum subscription amount available to a participating institution is 1 percent of risk-weighted assets. The maximum subscription amount is the lesser of $25 billion or 3 percent of risk-weighted assets. Treasury will fund the senior preferred shares purchased under the program by year-end 2008. Institutions interested in participating in the program should contact their primary federal regulator for specific enrollment details.
The senior preferred shares will qualify as Tier 1 capital and will rank senior to common stock and pari passu, which is at an equal level in the capital structure, with existing preferred shares, other than preferred shares which by their terms rank junior to any other existing preferred shares. The senior preferred shares will pay a cumulative dividend rate of 5 percent per annum for the first five years and will reset to a rate of 9 percent per annum after year five. The senior preferred shares will be non-voting, other than class voting rights on matters that could adversely affect the shares. The senior preferred shares will be callable at par after three years. Prior to the end of three years, the senior preferred may be redeemed with the proceeds from a qualifying equity offering of any Tier 1 perpetual preferred or common stock. Treasury may also transfer the senior preferred shares to a third party at any time. In conjunction with the purchase of senior preferred shares, Treasury will receive warrants to purchase common stock with an aggregate market price equal to 15 percent of the senior preferred investment. The exercise price on the warrants will be the market price of the participating institution’s common stock at the time of issuance, calculated on a 20-trading day trailing average.
Companies participating in the program must adopt the Treasury Department’s standards for executive compensation and corporate governance, for the period during which Treasury holds equity issued under this program. These standards generally apply to the chief executive officer, chief financial officer, plus the next three most highly compensated executive officers.
The financial institution must meet certain standards, including: (1) ensuring that incentive compensation for senior executives does not encourage unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the financial institution; (2) required clawback of any bonus or incentive compensation paid to a senior executive based on statements of earnings, gains or other criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate; (3) prohibition on the financial institution from making any golden parachute payment to a senior executive based on the Internal Revenue Code provision; and (4) agreement not to deduct for tax purposes executive compensation in excess of $500,000 for each senior executive. Treasury has issued interim final rules for these executive compensation standards.
Nine large financial institutions already have agreed to participate in this program, moving quickly and collectively to signal the importance of the program for the system. These healthy institutions have voluntarily agreed to participate on the same terms that will be available to small and medium-sized banks and thrifts across the nation.
Here is the term sheet for companies using it:
Video:
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long WFC, C, GS, none
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Here it is for those who were wondering…
October 14, 2008
2008-10-14-9-5-0-19994
Treasury Announces Executive Compensation Rules Under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
Washington- The U.S. Treasury Department today announced the development of three programs under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act and corresponding executive compensation and corporate governance standards. These standards generally apply to the chief executive officer, chief financial officer, plus the next three most highly compensated executive officers. Any firm participating in the following three programs will be required to adopt these standards.
Troubled Asset Auction Program- Treasury continues to develop a program to purchase troubled mortgage-related assets through an auction format, and will be issuing program guidance for this program in the coming weeks. Treasury is issuing guidance for the executive compensation requirements that will apply to firms participating in this program. As prescribed by the Act, any financial institution that sells more than $300 million of troubled assets to the Treasury via an auction would be prohibited from entering into new executive employment contracts that include golden parachutes for the term of the program. Treasury is releasing Treasury Notice 2008-TAAP regarding this restriction. Furthermore, under the Act, (1) the financial institution may not deduct for tax purposes executive compensation in excess of $500,000 for each senior executive, (2) the financial institution may not deduct certain golden parachute payments to its senior executives and (3) a 20-percent excise tax will be imposed on the senior executive for these golden parachute payments. Treasury is releasing I.R.S. Notice 2008-94 regarding these new tax rules.
Capital Purchase Program- The Treasury is issuing guidance for this program designed to provide equity capital under standardized terms directly to certain financial institutions, further strengthening their capital structures to facilitate their continued lending in the capital markets. Any financial institution participating in the Capital Purchase Program will be subject to more stringent executive compensation rules for the period during which Treasury holds equity issued under this program. The financial institution must meet certain standards, including: (1) ensuring that incentive compensation for senior executives does not encourage unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the financial institution; (2) required clawback of any bonus or incentive compensation paid to a senior executive based on statements of earnings, gains, or other criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate; (3) prohibition on the financial institution from making any golden parachute payment to a senior executive based on the Internal Revenue Code provision; and (4) agreement not to deduct for tax purposes executive compensation in excess of $500,000 for each senior executive. Treasury is issuing interim final rules for these executive compensation standards.
Programs for Systemically Significant Failing Institutions- The Treasury Department is currently developing a third program to potentially provide direct assistance to certain failing firms on terms negotiated on a case-by-case basis. Treasury is issuing guidance for the executive compensation standards that will apply to the firms participating in such programs and their senior executives (Treasury Notice 2008-PSSFI). These standards are similar in all respects to the Capital Purchase Programs executive compensation standards described above, with one significant difference. In situations where Treasury provides assistance under the systemically significant failing institutions programs, golden parachutes will be defined more strictly to prohibit any payments to departing senior executives.
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Graham and Doddsville Newsletter
Here is the link for the latest issue from Columbia Business School.
Featured are Warren Buffett, Mohnish Pabrai and Bill Ackman
FULL ISSUE. PDF
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