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CRE/CMBS Disaster Imminent? Not So Fast

The general theory has been, and even I speculated here in March that commercial real estate (CRE) & commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) may be the next shoe to drop. But, there have been some event recently that force us to take a closer look.

Since March we have seen improvement in the AAA rated CMBS market, mostly due to the TALF being used there. Again, no comment on the “right or wrong” of this action, but it is undeniably helping this market.

Then we had none other than Sam Zell coming out and saying that all the talk of a REIT industry “melt down” was overblown.

Most recently was the very important news that loan servicers were looking at extending maturities on debt from the customary 6-12 months to out as far as 5 years

Now this from the WSJ:

With the commercial real-estate industry bracing itself for the onslaught of hundreds of billions of dollars in maturing loans, the Treasury is considering issuing rules that will make it easier for property developers and investors and their loan servicers to restructure debt, according to people familiar with the matter.

Tax rules make it difficult for borrowers who are current on their payments to hold restructuring talks with the servicers of commercial mortgages that were packaged and sold as bonds. This lack of flexibility was one of the reasons cited by the management of mall giant General Growth Properties Inc. for its Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in April.

At present, developers and investors complain that only those who are delinquent can talk to servicers of these bonds, named commercial-mortgage-backed securities, or CMBS. But now the Treasury is considering issuing guidance that would allow servicers to start talking about ways to avoid defaults and foreclosures sooner, possibly at least two years ahead of the maturity date of a loan, these people said. The Treasury guidance, which could be released within weeks, would essentially enable loan-modification talks to take place without triggering tax consequences, these people say.

What does it mean? If we convert this to housing. You are having trouble with you loan. Under the current rules, the banks could not talk to you about altering your loan until you defaulted. Once is default on commercial loans, all sort of cross defaults and debt covenants are triggers across other debt. This is bad.

When Treasury alters the current rules, loans can be altered BEFORE default. This huge and it retrospect may have save General Growth Properties (GGWPQ) from Chapter 11 as it was not able to restructure loans until it defaulted which then drove into 11.

Back to the article:

… property owners and investors hoping to restructure troubled mortgages are hearing a tough message from CMBS servicers: We can’t talk to you unless you first fall behind on payments. This is because when CMBS offerings are created, the underlying mortgages are legally held by tax-free trusts. The trusts can be forced to pay taxes if the underlying loans are modified before they become delinquent, according to current CMBS rules.

“It can be frustrating,” says Monty Bennett, chief executive of Ashford Hospitality Trust Inc. The Dallas-based real-estate investment trust that owns 102 upscale hotels has tried to start negotiations with servicers for extensions of payment deadlines for CMBS loans coming due. They have had little success. “You’re trying to be proactive and get a plan together to address [a loan maturity], but you can’t get someone to talk to you

There are scores of operationally healthy REIT’s that will simply not be able to restructure debt as it comes due to stagnant credit markets and will suffer the same fate as GGWPWQ. By allowing refinancing (for lack of a better word) before default, many will be avoided. Will there still be defaults and REIT collapses? Yes. But the key difference will be that those falling by the wayside will not be healthy organizations but the weak that deserve to fade away.

Yesterday I had an email exchange with Davidson on the subject and he said:

All the noise about Alt-A and Commercial Real Estate being the tsunami on the horizon tells me that this one will be solved as well. I can tell you that private equity funds of $billions have been established to capture value. Roth of Vornado (VNO), Simon of Simon Prop (SPG) have cash to buy up the best properties that may be thrown on the market. Some one may take a hit but these guys may be stumbling over themselves to buy this troubled stuff and in the end a solution will clear the inventory.

It would seem that the commercial real estate (CRE) market has watched and learned something from what happened in housing. They are taking proactive steps to stave off a total meltdown. For instance REIT’s have already issued equity and cut dividends (issuing them in stock rather than cash) ahead of problems rather than well after as the banks did with housing. This means that going into any problem they are already capitalized to levels that will allow far more of them to remain healthy and actually expand operations as this develops.

Does it mean there is not some pain in store? There surely is. But, I think one has to revisit the “total collapse” meme and perhaps materially alter that. Now if Treasury opts not to modify the current rule (which does not make much sense by the way) then we may very well see considerable pain here. Based on recent actions though, I think it is safe to assume something is coming from them.

I am going to begin to look far closer at this sector and will report in as I find things..


Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long GGWPQ, None

7 replies on “CRE/CMBS Disaster Imminent? Not So Fast”

Good post, and I agree with your basic premise that the "total collapse" meme should be revisited. However, I don't think allowing servicers to modify CMBS loans before borrowers default will change things much. With a residential loan, no one on the lender side knows anything about the situation of the borrower until the borrower calls and asks for a modification. In contrast, CMBS servicers obtain extensive operating data on the collateral quarterly or more often, and are thoroughly familiar with these properties. Restructuring a loan is not rocket science – there are only so many ways to do it, and there is no reason borrowers and servicers can't rapidly reach an agreement when a loan goes delinquent if everyone is inclined to do so. They usually don't, for reasons I go through at the link below, but it's not because a default is required to start talking. Lenders not subject to the CMBS rules often take the "you must default first" stance too, because until a borrower actually defaults, you don't know for sure that they will not continue to make the contractual payments.

http://residentialpropertyanalytics.blogspot.com/2009/05/what-should-lenders-do-with-maturing.html

Kevin,

too a point i agree. there are plenty of healthy REIT that will not be able to roll loans as they come due. because of that they will default.

if the rules are altered so they can alter loans before default, then i think a decent chunk of the industry will avoid it…

Nice article Todd. Another point to think about…I believe that CMBS debt made up only about 28% of all commercial loans in 2007 (as a comparison RMBS made up about 60%). To me this says that a large portion of CRE loans are portfolio loans. Since these loans are on the balance sheets of lenders, extensions and modifications may be more viable since they are not restricted by the tax laws of REMIC. I believe that the common perception is that REITs rely heavily on CMBS for their financing. I agree with your article and I hope the modifications are allowed. But even if they are not, I still believe that calls for a REIT implosion are overstated and REITs hold an advantage over non-REIT CRE.

REITBull – you're right, CMBS was just about 1/4 of the market, and most of the maturities coming over the next few years are on regional banks' books, not CMBS.

A lot of REIT debt is in CMBS: CMBS as a Percentage of Total Unsecured & Secured Debt: GGP – 54.96%; SPG – 50.71%; VNO – 47.72%; Maguire – 91.73%; DDR – 39.65%; SLGreen – 61.04%.

I don't buy the argument that GGP is making regarding modifications. MetLife was out earlier this week stating that they were never approached by GGP about a modification on a loan they own…

DarkSpace- Thanks for the stats on the CMBS debt and the link you provided to the table of CMBS debt. That is very helpful and just what I'm looking for. I've also found your articles over on The CRE Review to be very informative.

One quick question…How are you able to distinguish between secured debt that is CMBS and secured debt that is non-CMBS? Do you need special tools for this or could I figure this out using a
10K? You gave me some good suggestions on another posting (i.e. the Bloomberg tool, CoStar, etc.) but I was hoping there was some way of figuring this out using the 10K or some other form of public info. Thanks again for your help.

REITBull – no, you really need to have a database with all the CMBS debt and who owns what properties – that isn't even clear from the prepackaged databases from Intex/Trepp/Realpoint. I put about a 8 months into combining data from various sources to get there.

The secured debt that is non-CMBS – I took the publicly available data that Bloomberg has compiled (I took their numbers at face value) on total secured and unsecured debt, and just subtracted the CMBS debt from that number.

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