Just a little video of the upcoming GPhone from Google (GOOG)
Disclosure (“none” means no position):None
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Bernanke on Systemic Risk
Ben Bernanke gave a speech today in Jackson Hole on “Reducing Systemic Risk”
Here are some parts and a full text link the end.
On Bear Stern episode:
“An effective means of increasing the resilience of the financial system is to strengthen its infrastructure. For my purposes today, I want to construe “financial infrastructure” very broadly, to include not only the “hardware” components of that infrastructure–the physical systems on which market participants rely for the quick and accurate execution, clearing, and settlement of transactions–but also the associated “software,” including the statutory, regulatory, and contractual frameworks and the business practices that govern the actions and obligations of market participants on both sides of each transaction. Of course, a robust financial infrastructure has many benefits even in normal times, including lower transactions costs and greater market liquidity. In periods of extreme stress, however, the quality of the financial infrastructure may prove critical. For example, it greatly affects the ability of market participants to quickly determine their own positions and exposures, including exposures to key counterparties, and to adjust their positions as necessary. When positions and exposures cannot be determined rapidly–as was the case, for example, when program trades overwhelmed the system during the 1987 stock market crash–potential outcomes include highly risk-averse behavior by market participants, sharp declines in market liquidity, and high volatility in asset prices. The financial infrastructure also has important effects on how market participants respond to perceived changes in counterparty risk. For example, during a period of heightened stress, participants may be willing to provide liquidity to a market if a strong central counterparty is present but not otherwise.
Considerations of this type were very much in our minds during the Bear Stearns episode in March. The collapse of Bear Stearns was triggered by a run of its creditors and customers, analogous to the run of depositors on a commercial bank. This run was surprising, however, in that Bear Stearns’s borrowings were largely secured–that is, its lenders held collateral to ensure repayment even if the company itself failed. However, the illiquidity of markets in mid-March was so severe that creditors lost confidence that they could recoup their loans by selling the collateral. Many short-term lenders declined to renew their loans, driving Bear to the brink of default.
Although not an extraordinarily large company by many metrics, Bear Stearns was deeply involved in a number of critical markets, including (as I have noted) markets for short-term secured funding as well as those for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. One of our concerns was that the infrastructures of those markets and the risk- and liquidity-management practices of market participants would not be adequate to deal in an orderly way with the collapse of a major counterparty. With financial conditions already quite fragile, the sudden, unanticipated failure of Bear Stearns would have led to a sharp unwinding of positions in those markets that could have severely shaken the confidence of market participants. The company’s failure could also have cast doubt on the financial conditions of some of Bear Stearns’s many counterparties or of companies with similar businesses and funding practices, impairing the ability of those firms to meet their funding needs or to carry out normal transactions. As more firms lost access to funding, the vicious circle of forced selling, increased volatility, and higher haircuts and margin calls that was already well advanced at the time would likely have intensified. The broader economy could hardly have remained immune from such severe financial disruptions. Largely because of these concerns, the Federal Reserve took actions that facilitated the purchase of Bear Stearns and the assumption of Bear’s financial obligations by JPMorgan Chase & Co.
This experience has led me to believe that one of the best ways to protect the financial system against future systemic shocks, including the possible failure of a major counterparty, is by strengthening the financial infrastructure, including both the “hardware” and the “software” components.”
On regulation:
“A systemwide focus for financial regulation would also increase attention to how the incentives and constraints created by regulations affect behavior, especially risk-taking, through the credit cycle. During a period of economic weakness, for example, a prudential supervisor concerned only with the safety and soundness of a particular institution will tend to push for very conservative lending policies. In contrast, the macroprudential supervisor would recognize that, for the system as a whole, excessively conservative lending policies could prove counterproductive if they contribute to a weaker economic and credit environment. Similarly, risk concentrations that might be acceptable at a single institution in a period of economic expansion could be dangerous if they existed at a large number of institutions simultaneously. I do not have the time today to do justice to the question of the procyclicality of, say, capital regulations and accounting rules. This topic has received a great deal of attention elsewhere and has also engaged the attention of regulators; in particular, the framers of the Basel II capital accord have made significant efforts to measure regulatory capital needs “through the cycle” to mitigate procyclicality. However, as we consider ways to strengthen the system for the future in light of what we have learned over the past year, we should critically examine capital regulations, provisioning policies, and other rules applied to financial institutions to determine whether, collectively, they increase the procyclicality of credit extension beyond the point that is best for the system as a whole.
A yet more ambitious approach to macroprudential regulation would involve an attempt by regulators to develop a more fully integrated overview of the entire financial system. In principle, such an approach would appear well justified, as our financial system has become less bank-centered and because activities or risk-taking not permitted to regulated institutions have a way of migrating to other financial firms or markets. Some caution is in order, however, as this more comprehensive approach would be technically demanding and possibly very costly both for the regulators and the firms they supervise. It would likely require at least periodic surveillance and information-gathering from a wide range of nonbank institutions. Increased coordination would be required among the private- and public-sector supervisors of exchanges and other financial markets to keep up to date with evolving practices and products and to try to identify those which may pose risks outside the purview of each individual regulator. International regulatory coordination, already quite extensive, would need to be expanded further.”
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Berkshire Hathaway’s (BRK.A) Warren Buffett cover everything from debt to calling on donors to sue Jon Edwards.
The Buffett and Gates Energy Tour:
On Fannie (FNM), Freddie (FRE) and Oil (USO):
Buffett on former Democratic Presidential Candidate Jon Edwards:
Buffett on Debt:
Buffett on Financials: He bought more of either Wells Fargo (WFC) or American Express (AXP). My gut tells me it more Wells Fargo.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long WFC, none
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So, yesterday Doug Kass defended short sellers and today Martin Whitman of the Third Avenue Value Fund (TAVFX), take them apart. Now, I do not have decades of investing experience but I do not remember a time where there was such clear and intense battle lines drawn.
MBIA (MBI) & Ambac (ABK) are at the epicenter of this battle. Whitman writes:
“In management’s letter last quarter, it was observed that short sellers and bear raiders have never been more powerful. TAVF operates differently from short sellers. At Third Avenue, Fund Management tries to avoid investment risk, i.e., something going wrong with the business or the securities issued by that business. TAVF pretty much ignores market risk, i.e., fluctuations in market prices. Short sellers, on the other hand, have to be acutely conscious of market risk. If the security they are short rises in price, short sellers have to come up with more collateral. If short sellers buy puts, and the security price does not go down, it is “sudden death” at the date of expiration of the put options.
As a consequence of the need to be so sensitive to market prices, bear raiders seem to tend very much to engage in nefarious activities, whether legal or not. First, the shorts condition markets any way they can, whether by spreading rumors or issuing
analyses where the consequences for long security holders are deemed to be draconian if the buyer continues to hold. Sometimes the true intentions of the short sellers are masked. For example, William Ackman appears to be disingenuous when he writes and
talks about saving MBIA’s policyholders. Why does he care about policyholders? Ackman’s objective is to drive down the market price of MBIA securities. The bear raiders have enjoyed great success. Bear Stearns (BSC) lost its creditworthiness when customers and counterparties reacted to rumors and stopped doing transactions with Bear.Lehman Brothers Holdings has been hurt by the same kind of rumor mongering. TAVF no longer will invest knowingly in the common stocks of companies that need relatively
continuous access to capital markets; or where customers and counterparties can flee without appreciable costs. Fund management does not believe that Ambac and MBIA, both of which are the objects of bear raiders, can ever have a Bear Stearns type of experience. The great weight of probabilities seems to be that both companies enjoy such financial strength that they can survive almost any stress. For TAVF, the activities of the short sellers have meant that securities became available for purchase at far, far lower prices than would otherwise be the case. The most nefarious aspect of the short sellers revolves around their concerted efforts to destroy, or at least diminish, the companies’ existence as going concerns. In the cases of Ambac and MBIA, the short sellers have been bringing as much pressure as they can on rating agencies, insurance regulators and securities regulators to downgrade Ambac and MBIA, to demonstrate insolvency and to prevent either company from accessing capital markets.It should be noted that until the recent SEC inquiries, short sellers were pretty much free to say, or write, whatever they like. There is no apparent downside for being a “loose cannon”. Managements and insiders, however, are quite restricted in what they can say or write because of securities laws, in general, and
Sarbanes-Oxley attestations and auditor limits, in particular. In informing uninformed investors, there does not seem to exist a level playing field.I will write to you again when the Annual Report for the period to end October 31, 2008 is published.
Sincerely yours,
Martin J. Whitman
Chairman of the Board”
Read Full Letter Here
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long TAVFX, none
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Friday’s Links
Bloggers, Greenspan, Waksal, College Drinking, ethanol
– David Merkel set the record straight
– Felix is right……….just shut up
– Raise your hand if you forgot about him…be honest..
– OK, This is the most important thing educators have to deal with? How about this, ACTUALLY PUNISH PEOPLE FOR BREAKING THE LAW. Maybe if the rule was, “you are underage and get caught with booze on campus, your out of school”? Right, “then will go off campus and drink”, “educators” will say. OK, then let the police ARREST THEM. This is imbecilic. You mean to tell me if 18 year olds are allowed to break the rules without repercussions they do it? Really?
– Proof it is cheaper than gas
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I think people may look back at at the Gap trading around $15 earlier this summer and in time it may turn out to be the steal of the summer..
Before Glenn Murphy was even hired by Gap I said that if the new CEO was in the Edward Lampert at Sears (SHLD) or Julian Day at RadioShack (RSH) mold, shareholders would really benefit.
After he was hired I was positive on the choice based on his track record and continued to think he could produce there.
After Murphy announced his plans for the company, I could not help noticing something familiar about it.
As it has unfolded, the blueprint become more obvious. Shares have responded climbing 14% from their last summer low’s after Murphy’s hire.
Back in June I said:
Gap shareholders are going to do just fine under Murphy. Let’s not forget, with the exception of Wal-Mart (WMT), retailers are being savaged right now. The fact that Murphy’s shareholders (because of the company’s results) have escaped that must be telling us something, the plan is working.
Tonight Gap released results and surprised many:
G
ap (GPS) reported that second quarter net earnings increased 51 percent through the combination of driving healthy margins and effectively managing costs.
For the quarter ended August 2, 2008, net earnings were $229 million, or $0.32 per share on a diluted basis, compared with $152 million, or $0.19 per share, for the second quarter last year.
The 2007 second quarter diluted earnings per share included $0.02 of expenses related to the company’s cost reduction initiatives. Excluding the $0.02 per share of expenses, second quarter diluted earnings per share last year on a non-GAAP basis were $0.21 per share. Please see the reconciliation of diluted earnings per share on a GAAP basis to diluted earnings per share excluding the expenses associated with the company’s cost reduction initiatives, a non-GAAP financial measure, in the table at the end of this release.
“External conditions aside, we continue to deliver improved earnings with healthy margins and I am pleased with our second quarter results,” said Glenn Murphy, chairman and chief executive officer of Gap Inc. “While we continue to pursue our 2008 financial strategy, we are very focused on bringing more customers into our stores.”
If that was not good enough, they backed their full year guidance and also said they are sitting on $1.7 billion in cash after bringing in another $340 plus million during the quarter and buying back 16.3 million shares. Here is an interesting number, 12.3% of the Gap’s current market cap consists of the cash it has sitting in the bank.
Over the past year retailer like Target (TGT), Macy’s (M), Kohl’s (KSS) and JC Penny (JCP) have all seen their profits and share prices (50% decrease in some cases) shrunk. Murphy’s Gap has held it’s own and it share price, essentially flat over that time reflects that.
My guess is Gap shareholders are some pretty happy folks right about now
Disclosure (“none” means no position):
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Somehow I missed this when it was released…..sorry
Baupost Group head and value investor extraordinaire (by that I mean 20% plus annual returns) Seth Klarman has increased his stake in Borders Group (BGP).
Baupost now holds 5.72 million shares, up from 4.9 million held in the May filing.
What is really odd about the filing is the number of “blank check coporations” or SPAC’s Klarman owns shares in.
There is :
Capitol Acquisition Corp. (CLA)- 2.1m shares
BPW Acquisition Corp. (BPW)- 1.1 m shares (including warrants)
China Holdings Acquisition Corp. (HOL)- 1.05m shares
Columbus Acquisition Corp.- (BUS.U)- 750k shares
GHL Acquisition Corp (GHQ)- 3.5m shares (including warrants)
Global Consumer Acquisition Corp. (GHC)- 5.9m shares (including warrants)
GSC ACquisition Corp. (GGA)- 850k shares
Hicks Acquisition Corp. (TOH)- 1.9m shares
Highlands Acquisition Corp. (HIA)- 525k shares
Prospect Acquisition Corp. (PAX)- 3.4m shares (including warrants)
There are a total of 22 SPAC’s listed in the filing. I could not find any relationship to them other than the investment by Klarman and Baupost. It is odd and warrants more looking into. It does seem a bit odd that the SPAC’s are alleged to be “gambling” for ordinary investors but here we have a true value investor, and a very good one going headfirst into these things..
Disclosure (“none” means no position):
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Dow Chemical CEO Liveris in China
Watch this interview. Dow (DOW) CEO Liveris has a calmness about him I have not seen in a while. Gone is the pre-Rohm deal urgency he always had on camera. Sometimes what you don’t see matters more than what you do.
Here is the video:
I think it is due to the Rohm & Hass (ROH) deal and his discussion with Chinese officials. Liveris had promised shareholder he would transform the company’s earnings profile and the Rohm deal allowed him to do that overnight.
Rather than impressing on people the value proposition Dow holds for investors due to the actions they are undertaking and going to take, Liveris seems almost content now to sit back (not literally), watch the inevitable happen and then bask in the glow of a job well done.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long Dow
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Kass Defends Shorts Against SEC…..
Doug Kass has a piece in the FT today that is a must-read in the current environment.
Coming on the heals of my post last night, I think what Mr. Kass has to say, as an actual short seller is gospel on the subject.
Kass writes:
Short-selling runs deep in financial history. Perhaps the first case dates to 1609 when the Dutch trader, Isaac Le Maire, targeted the shares of the shipping company Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (the Dutch East India Company). VOC was the first multinational corporation in history and had broad powers. Nonetheless, Le Maire, concerned about threats of attack by English ships, sold VOC’s shares short. After learning about Le Maire’s tactics, the stock exchange governing VOC’s trading banned short-selling (although the ban was later revoked).
In the early 1630s, the Dutch economy fell into a depression following a speculative peak in the trading of tulips. Again, short-selling raised the ire of regulators, many of whom saw it as magnifying the effect on the Dutch economic downturn. As a result, England banned short-selling outright.
Almost 420 years later – in the late 1920s – short-sellers warned of the consequences of speculation. But in the aftermath of the Wall Street crash of 1929, many blamed them and the uptick rule – which banned short-selling on downticks – was instituted (and stayed in effect until 2007). More regulation governing short-selling came into force in 1940, with a ban on mutual funds from short-selling (though that law was lifted in 1997). In early 2005, the SEC again sought to restrict the practice.
Yet short-sellers have served as financial watchdogs, as many of their warnings have been spot on. The delusional dotcom boom in the late 1990s brought Cassandra-like utterings from the short-selling cabal that proved insightful but were largely ignored. After the subsequent 75 per cent collapse of the Nasdaq, a bull market in corporate fraud emerged and short-sellers such as David Rocker, founder of Rocker Partners, highlighted accounting problems at companies such as Sunbeam, Tyco and Lernout & Hauspie. Kynikos’ Jim Chanos played a role in uncovering the largest fraud in history when his contrary-minded analysis warned of Enron’s accounting shenanigans – which were emulated (but ignored by investors) in the banks’ recent dalliance with structured investment vehicles.
By the middle of the decade the property cycle was in full bloom and David Tice of the Prudent Bear Fund warned of the dire ramifications of a downward spiral in home prices on the levered balanced sheets of Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE). Soon thereafter, Nouriel Roubini, the economist, voiced particularly pessimistic forecasts about the housing market’s impact on credit.
Drawing a line between economic and market progress as against fantasy is a role taken by the few. Short-sellers provide an anchor of objectivity in an investment world populated by those more interested in rewards than in uncovering systemic risks. This week, Mr Cox said the SEC would announce new regulations to restrict short-selling. Instead of more regulation, the chairman and investors should begin listening to what short-sellers have to say about our economy and credit markets.
Kass points out the truth, until the things short sellers warn us of stop coming true, the SEC would be well advised to focus its energies elsewhere.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):None
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Blockbuster (BBI) offers almost a 100% premium to your current price and then complains your disclosure is inadequate, why would any other suitor step forward?
Circuit City (CC) announced:
Director James A. Marcum, 49, has been appointed vice chairman of the company. In this executive officer position, Marcum will play a key role in leading the efforts to accelerate the pace of the company’s turnaround.
“The board and I selected Jim for this role because he is a highly-experienced retail turnaround executive,” said Philip J. Schoonover, Circuit City’s chairman, president and chief executive officer. “I believe he will be a great partner to me and the rest of the management team as we focus on ways to improve our business. Today’s announcement shows that the management team remains fully committed to delivering value to shareholders in the near term through the successful execution of our turnaround plan. Meanwhile, the board continues to pursue strategic alternatives for the company that offer the best possible results for our shareholders in the long term.”
Why would any other buyer come forward? What will most likely happen is whomever may want it will wait until it files bankruptcy and then pick it up on the cheap.
Let’s not forget that this is the third offer in 5 years the company has scuttled. Any one of those offers would have shareholders far better off than they are today. Circuit City is just not a valuable enough asset for a potential buyer to go through the obvious hassle that would be involved in making an offer.
Now, things do get interesting if the new vice chairman is eventually placed in charge of the company, replacing current CEO Schoonover. But, until something like this happens, just sit back and watch it fall apart…
Disclosure (“none” means no position):None
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Leucadia Files 13D/A in AmeriCredit
Leucadia (LUK) tonihjy has filed a 13D/A with the SEC in AmeriCredit (ACF)
Applicable portion:
ITEM 5. INTEREST IN SECURITIES OF THE ISSUER.
Item 5 of the Schedule 13D is hereby amended and restated in its entirety, with effect from the date of this Amendment, as follows:
As of the date of this Amendment, the Leucadia Reporting Persons may be deemed to beneficially own an aggregate of 32,715,440 shares of Common Stock, representing approximately 28.1%of the shares of Common Stock outstanding. All percentages in this Item 5 are based on 116,311,716 shares of Common Stock outstanding as of the date of this Amendment.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):None
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Thursday’s Links
WSJ on blackberry, Reporting, Gphone, Frugality
– This reader is the best yet
– Any wonder folks do not reader papers for business anymore?
– Less debt would be better for all
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Sell Side Analysts…What do they do?
Somehow I’m constantly surprised at what the sell side analysts do and don’t focus on. Listening to the BKS Q2 call this morning there wasn’t a single question about Borders (BGP) (fresh topic considering there was an article in the WSJ last week about it) and not a single question about the announcement of the CEO of Barnes & Noble.com (BKS) resigning two days ago. All the street wanted to focus on was what the EPS for the year was going to be so they could slap a multiple on it and write a two paragraph note summarizing the press release.
Yes it’s highly likely that BKS management would have sidestepped the questions but the questions should have been asked anyway. You never know but maybe they would have given us a small bit of information in how they sidestep the questions or just the tone of their voice. Hey look even Colonel Jessup was dying to tell the truth. What’s even more shocking to me is when the sell side analysts are asked some of these question before the call in a private conversation and still don’t follow up on it.
It’s a real shame but in the end I guess it’s my fault…I shouldn’t be surprised!
Disclosure (“none” means no position): Long-BGP, None-BKS
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The SEC is ridiculous. When it comes to financials like Citi (C), Fannie (FNM), Freddie (FRE), Bear Sterns (BSC), Merrill Lynch (MER), Lehman (LEH) and Morgan Stanley (MS), the only people telling the truth are the shorts like Ackman, Einhorn, Loeb and Tilson. Why isn’t the management being investigated? Virtually every public statement they have made had in the end has been erroneous and the shorts, who have been right, are being called “rumor mongers”. If it is true, is it a rumor?
Is this like Bill Clinton and “it depends on what your definition of “is” is”?
Anyway, read what Loeb has to say about it in his Q2 letter dated 7/25.
During the second quarter of 2008, the market witnessed a significant increase in
regulatory activity by the SEC and other government entities. Over the past several
weeks, the SEC has served subpoenas on over 50 different hedge funds, seeking
information relating to short sales in Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, and the
dissemination of rumors about those companies in the market.This investigation comes at the same time that the SEC has implemented several other
measures designed to address short-selling. On July 15, 2008, the SEC instituted a 30-day emergency measure aiming to make the short-selling of certain financial institutions more difficult by requiring all sellers to borrow or enter into a bona fide agreement with the share lender to borrow the securities prior to the short sale.The SEC also recently announced that it is concerned about the deliberate spreading of false rumors by short-sellers – known as rumor mongering – which some have claimed led to the Bear Stearns implosion. To this end, the SEC announced that its regulators would immediately begin conducting examinations of broker-dealers and investment advisers to determine whether they have sufficient procedures in place to protect against the dissemination of false rumors.
As you may recall, the SEC conducted an audit of Third Point last year after we
registered as an investment advisor. During the course of the audit, the examination staff noted that we regularly communicate with portfolio managers at other hedge funds about investment and trading ideas. The SEC later informed us that it had commenced a formal investigation of Third Point primarily relating to these types of communications. Such conversations permit us to test our hypotheses and refine our thinking and, as a result, we believe that participating in give-and-take with other managers is in the best interest of our investors. Our outside counsel has examined this matter thoroughly and assured us that our position is consistent with the securities laws and that we have not violated any law in connection with these communications.Regulatory matters are certainly playing a significant role in the life of hedge funds as the obligations and demands of the current regulatory environment continue to increase. However, rest assured that we have a strong operational and legal team to assist me in these endeavors, and as a result, all of us on the investment team at Third Point remain completely focused on our investment activities and maximizing returns for our investors.
Is the fact that the company’s are able to place the “safe harbor” disclaimers after their filings that eliminate them from investigation? Does that magically make whatever they say, when it turns out to be spectacularly wrong a “mulligan”?
When it was required of company’s to place the “investment risks” and safe harbor in the filings, is it now the unintended consequence of those actions the fact that management is now able to paint as rosy picture as humanly possible on the business and those statements and the presumptions they give investors are only good for the day they are filed? Have we, in a effort to get “more disclosure” from them, in essence, indemnified management from any legal recourse for their public statements?
Yet, short sellers are not protected from making the same statements, only in an opposing thesis, even if that thesis is ultimately born out as accurate? Are we only protecting optimism, even if it is disingenuous, for lack of a better word while punishing honest pessimism?
Now, it is true that cases have not been brought by the SEC (yet) but, let’s be honest, one would be painfully naive to think that SEC investigations of 50 hedge funds would not have a chilling effect on those who might be inclined to short sell. If shorting Lehman is going to bring and SEC investigation and additional legal costs, is it worth it for the small fund? Probably not.
Is the SEC trying to shut down communications between hedge funds? What is a rumor and what is an opinion? Are they issuing subpoena’s to execs at Citi, Merrill and Lehman asking for all their internal communication and communications they have had with each other so we cab ascertain when they new they would need additional capital and if this contradicts public statements?
Personally, I do not have the stomach to be a short, not in my nature. If you can do it, go for it. The SEC ought to require shorts to disclose their positions, just like longs do. But, they ought not single them out for dissection because we do not like what they say.
Don’t kill the messenger because you do not like the news, go after the guys who created the bad news the messenger delivers…
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long C, none
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The timing of this one is just really odd..
Barnes & Noble Inc (BKS), the largest U.S. specialty bookseller, said on Tuesday the chief executive of its online business resigned
Barnes & Noble said Marie J. Toulantis’s duties have been assumed by E-Commerce vice president Tom Burke and Kevin Frain, its chief financial officer. The bookseller said Toulantis will remain with the company as a consultant.
Now, this comes just a week after its rival, Borders (BGP) online results became public and BKS said it would not be able to finance a deal for Borders.
The graphs on the previous post show Borders online traffic and conversions surging since going live in June through July 26. One must assume this trend has continued and that Borders gains are coming at the expense of Barnes and Noble, not so much Amazon (AMZN).
Here is the chart:
Borders did a great job on the site and it is being marketed to Rewards members brilliantly. It’s current conversion rate of 5% is up from 2.5% when it was part of amazon and now just behind Barnes & Noble’s 5.9% after only 8 weeks (as of 7/26).
Borders is scheduled to report next week, the 28th. I have a feeling, and I hope the analysts on the call ask a ton of questions about the online results, investors will be happy.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long BGP, none
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