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The Week’s Best At VIN

A long list for the week away at Value Investing News

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The Week's Best At VIN

A long list for the week away at Value Investing News

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Rhode Island SC Ruling Due Next Week?

Jane Genova Reports

RI SC RULING EXPECTED 6/1 or 6/2 – Informed sources indicate

Informed sources reported to me today that a ruling is expected from the Rhode Island Supreme Court on the the lead paint public nuisance appeal this coming Tuesday or Wednesday.

Those sources are anticipating a decision favorable to the three defendants Sherwin-Williams (SHW), NL Indusries (NL) and Millennium Holdings. How favorable is the issue. There could be a third trial rather than the whole enchilada being tossed.

We lead paint watchers are also very interested in the opinion of the RI SC on contingency, particularly in relation to the issue of separation of powers.

Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long SHW, none

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Blackrocks (BLK) Bob Doll

Since he has billions to invest, it bears listening to him..

Doll discusses the S&P, Oil (USO), the Fed, European Bankers, Speculation, Merrill Lynch (MER)

Disclosure (“none” means no position):None

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Another Vacation

So headed out again this time for 10 days Saturday.

The family is heading to upstate New York to Lake Tuscarora for 10 days of fishing, campfires and nana time for the kids…

Last year we had no internet (or cell) access so I am not sure if we will this year on the lake. At any rate, even if we do, posting will be extremely limited if not non-existent, this is kiddie time. If anyone wants to be able to post in my absence, let me know and we can set something up. I have a handful of folks in mind….

My goal is to get through the following books.

I have started Einhorn’s and so far it is great……..

and

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Friday’s Links

Oil, JC Penny, War, Recession

– The speculators?

– This is great “outrage“.

– Of course they have…..we are winning it

– Well, maybe that is because we really have not had one in that long?

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Friday's Links

Oil, JC Penny, War, Recession

– The speculators?

– This is great “outrage“.

– Of course they have…..we are winning it

– Well, maybe that is because we really have not had one in that long?

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Bruce Berkowitz (video)

Fairholme’s (FAIRX) Bruce Berkowitz talks about his latest foray into health care.

Berkowitz top 5 holdings are
Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A)
Canadian Natural Resources (CNQ)
Sears Holdings (SHLD)
DISH Network (DISH)
Mohawk Industries (MHK)

Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long SHLD, none

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Friday’s Upgrades and Downgrades


UPGRADES
Coldwater Creek (CWTR)- CL King Accumulate » Strong Buy
SuccessFactors (SFSF)- Wedbush Morgan Hold » Buy
Zoran (ZRAN)- Longbow Neutral » Buy
Lincare (LNCR)- Wachovia Mkt Perform » Outperform
Pantry (PTRY)- Friedman Billings Mkt Perform » Outperform
Check Point Sftwr (CHKP)- Lehman Brothers Equal-Weight » Overweight
Corinthian Colleges (COCO)- Lehman Brothers Equal-Weight » Overweight
Host Hotels (HST)- Robert W. Baird Neutral » Outperform
City National (CYN)- Keefe Bruyette Mkt Perform » Outperform

DOWNGRADES
i2 Tech (ITWO)- Susquehanna Financial Positive » Neutral
F5 Networks (FFIV)- McAdams Wright Ragen Buy » Hold
Goldman Sachs (GS)- Wachovia Outperform » Mkt Perform
Spectrum Brands (SPC)- BMO Capital Markets Market Perform » Underperform
Research In Motion (RIMM)- JMP Securities Mkt Outperform » Mkt Perform
PG&E (PCG)- Jefferies & Co Buy » Hold
MGM Mirage (MGM)- JP Morgan Overweight » Neutral
Red Hat (RHT)- Oppenheimer Outperform » Perform
Entergy (ETR)- Banc of America Sec Buy » Neutral
AstraZeneca (AZN)- HSBC Securities Neutral » Underweight
British Sky Brdcst (BSY)- JP Morgan Overweight » Underweight
WuXi PharmaTech (WX)- Oppenheimer Outperform » Perform

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Friday's Upgrades and Downgrades


UPGRADES
Coldwater Creek (CWTR)- CL King Accumulate » Strong Buy
SuccessFactors (SFSF)- Wedbush Morgan Hold » Buy
Zoran (ZRAN)- Longbow Neutral » Buy
Lincare (LNCR)- Wachovia Mkt Perform » Outperform
Pantry (PTRY)- Friedman Billings Mkt Perform » Outperform
Check Point Sftwr (CHKP)- Lehman Brothers Equal-Weight » Overweight
Corinthian Colleges (COCO)- Lehman Brothers Equal-Weight » Overweight
Host Hotels (HST)- Robert W. Baird Neutral » Outperform
City National (CYN)- Keefe Bruyette Mkt Perform » Outperform

DOWNGRADES
i2 Tech (ITWO)- Susquehanna Financial Positive » Neutral
F5 Networks (FFIV)- McAdams Wright Ragen Buy » Hold
Goldman Sachs (GS)- Wachovia Outperform » Mkt Perform
Spectrum Brands (SPC)- BMO Capital Markets Market Perform » Underperform
Research In Motion (RIMM)- JMP Securities Mkt Outperform » Mkt Perform
PG&E (PCG)- Jefferies & Co Buy » Hold
MGM Mirage (MGM)- JP Morgan Overweight » Neutral
Red Hat (RHT)- Oppenheimer Outperform » Perform
Entergy (ETR)- Banc of America Sec Buy » Neutral
AstraZeneca (AZN)- HSBC Securities Neutral » Underweight
British Sky Brdcst (BSY)- JP Morgan Overweight » Underweight
WuXi PharmaTech (WX)- Oppenheimer Outperform » Perform

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More on Sears Holdings "Going Private"

Ever since the first post on this issue I have been looking into this further. Today’s Autozone (AZO) filing with ESL (Sears Holdings (SHLD) largest shareholder) gave me the information I needed.

From the Findlaw Legal site

“Delaware’s Analysis

Fiduciary principles have long been established to protect minority shareholders in interested transactions. This protection is embodied in the “entire fairness” standard, a reasonably stringent review. Under a fairly recent line of cases, controlling shareholders can avoid the entire fairness review by structuring their going-private transaction as a tender offer. As described in the Delaware Chancery’s decision In re Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, Delaware courts now apply two distinct fiduciary standards to boards evaluating a controlling shareholder’s acquisition of the remaining shares of a company.7 On the one hand, as detailed in Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc., Delaware courts apply the “entire fairness” standard to long-form merger transactions involving a controlling shareholder:

“The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s stock. However, the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of this issue must be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness.” 8

Moreover, in Lynch “[t]he Court held that the stringent entire fairness form of review governed . . . [even though]: i) the target board was comprised of a majority of independent directors; ii) a special committee of the target’s independent directors was empowered to negotiate and veto the merger; and iii) the merger was made subject to approval by a majority of the disinterested target stockholders.”9 Even with these additional protective mechanisms, the Kahn Court determined that merger transactions involving a controlling shareholder contain an “inherent coercion” of the interests of minority shareholders, thereby requiring the more stringent “entire fairness” standard.

On the other hand, as demonstrated in Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp., Delaware courts do not apply the “entire fairness” standard to tender-offer transactions involving a controlling shareholder if the tender offer is not coercive.10 Specifically, the Solomon Court found that “in the absence of coercion or disclosure violations, the adequacy of price in a voluntary tender offer cannot be an issue.”11 Recent decisions in In re Aquila12 and In re Siliconix Inc. Shareholders Litigation have followed this doctrine and found that “unless coercion or disclosure violations can be shown, no defendant has the duty to demonstrate the entire fairness of . . . [a] proposed tender offer.”13 The tender offers in Siliconix and Aquila contained a majority of the minority tender conditions and agreements to consummate DGCL §253 mergers at the same price as the tender offers. While the Chancery Court in those cases determined that the tender offers were not coercive, they did not specify factors for determining whether a tender offer is coercive.

In Pure Resources, while the Chancery Court “remain[ed] less than satisfied that there is a justifiable basis for the distinction between the Lynch and Solomon lines of cases,”14 it was unwilling to apply the Lynch “entire fairness” standard to tender offers involving a controlling shareholder. The Court found “the preferable policy is to continue to adhere to the . . . Solomon approach, while giving some greater recognition to the inherent coercion and structural basis concerns that motivate the Lynch line of cases.”15 In an effort to blend both lines of thought and expand upon the decisions in Siliconix and Aquila, the Court determined that a tender offer by a controlling shareholder would be noncoercive only when “1) it is subject to a nonwaivable majority of the minority tender condition; 2) the controlling stockholder promises to consummate a prompt [DGCL]§253 merger at the same price if it obtains more than 90% of the shares; and 3) the controlling stockholder has made no retributive threats.” Accordingly, although the distinction between a noncoercive tender offer and a long-form merger appears to rest on form over substance and has been questioned by commentators (e.g., Franklin Balotti), Delaware courts continue to honor the distinction.16

Conclusion

As seen by the Delaware Chancery’s decision in Next Level Communications, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.17, target boards evaluating going-private transactions involving a controlling shareholder should continue to use the framework provided in Pure Resources. Whether a going-private transaction involving a controlling shareholder is structured as a merger or a tender offer, additional protective mechanisms should be employed to insulate target boards from breaching their fiduciary duties. For long-form mergers, “an approval of the transaction by an independent committee of the directors or an informed majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness from the controlling or dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff.”18 Alternatively, tender offers can avoid a coercive taint by including (i) a nonwaivable majority of the minority tender requirement, (ii) a back end short-form merger at the same price as the tender offer, and (iii) the absence of any retributive threats.19 Given the Chancery’s internal struggle with this issue, the Delaware courts appear likely to revisit the matter.”

Sears Holdings is a Delaware Corp. and would fall under its jurisdiction should this come up.

Any attempt by ESL to take Sears private would fail the “fairness” tests.

Price. Lampert has publicly said repeatedly that the market is undervaluing Sears shares and its prospects. Those statements alone would require him to offer a massive premium to the current price in order to satisfy the “fairness in price” requirement.

“Majority of minority”. In order to be free of a “coercive” offer claim, a majority of the minority shareholders would have to vote for the transaction. Does anyone really think Legg Mason, Pershing and Bill Ackman and Bruce Berkowitz, who all own shares in the $100 plus range would vote for a deal for anything less that what they bought shares at? Do we think they would demand a nice premium to even consider saying ok? Me too..

Those three hold 22% of the outstanding shares or, a virtual “majority of the minority”. Here is the kicker. As Lampert uses Sears cash to buy up shares to increase his ownership, he also increases theirs, giving them even more power in any deal.

Special deal for the big three to sell? Nope. This is what killed the Sears Canada deal. Pershing argued that Lampert achieved his “majority of the minority” by offering the banks that gave him their shares a higher price that the rest of the shareholders. The courts ruled that this is “unfair” to the remaining shareholders and ruled the “majority” Lampert had invalid. Without the bank shares being counted, Lampert lost his “majority”. The same scenario would hold here. Any deal the big three get, we would also.

The oft said “if Lampert owns 60% of the shares he can do whatever he wants” claims are patently false. As a shareholder, no matter how small, you do have rights…

Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long SHLD, none

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ESL / Autozone Agreement Filed with SEC

Here are the applicable portions.

Section 3.1 New Directors.

In accordance with the provisions of this Article III, the Company shall take appropriate actions, once nominees are identified satisfying the requirements of Section 3.2, to add three (3) new members to the Board (the “New Directors”). It is the intent of the parties that such additions shall occur as promptly as practicable, but in no case later than the Company’s 2008 Annual Meeting of Stockholders.

Section 3.2 Selection of New Directors.

(a) An independent search agency has been engaged to identify a nominee for one (1) of the New Director positions (the “Specified Director”) pursuant to criteria previously determined by the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee and all of the directors shall be permitted to propose persons as suggested candidates for the Specified Director to such independent search agency. A candidate identified shall be considered by the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee in accordance with its regular policies and procedures, which shall include, without limitation, consideration of such candidate’s background, competencies and experience. A candidate shall be recommended by the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee as a nominee for election by the Board as the Specified Director only if he or she is (a) deemed to be “independent” pursuant to the Company’s corporate governance principles and the rules and regulations of the New York Stock Exchange and (b) reasonably acceptable to both ESL and a majority of the members of the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee. Only a nominee who is recommended by the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee shall be presented to the Board as a potential nominee for election as the Specified Director.

(b) Two (2) New Directors (the “Non-Specified Directors”) shall be appointed from nominees identified by ESL, including persons suggested by other directors to ESL who are reasonably acceptable to ESL (any such person, a “Candidate”). Each Candidate identified shall be considered by the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee in accordance with its regular policies and procedures, which shall include, without limitation, consideration of such Candidate’s background, competencies, experience and affiliation with ESL (if any). Only candidates which are reasonably acceptable to both ESL and a majority of the members of the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee may be recommended by the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee for election to the Board. Either or both of the two Candidates may, at ESL’s discretion, be an officer of ESL and its affiliated investment entities. Each candidate shall qualify as “independent” pursuant to the Company’s corporate governance principles and the rules and regulations of the New York Stock Exchange. The Company will use its reasonable best efforts to have the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee promptly recommend Candidates for election to the Board once candidates are identified satisfying the requirements above.

(c) Subject to the nomination of directors in accordance with the provisions of Section 3.2(a) and 3.2(b), the Company’s Board of Directors shall promptly take all action required to cause the Specified Director and Non-Specified Directors to be so elected.

Section 6.3 Future Sales and/or Transactions Involving an Acquisition of the Company.

(a) ESL shall not dispose or agree to dispose of any shares of Common Stock pursuant to any agreement, arrangement or understanding (whether or not in writing), including by way of merger or other business combination, at a price above the market price per share prevailing at the time of such agreement, arrangement or understanding, without taking appropriate steps to ensure that the purchaser of such shares simultaneously provides all other holders of Common Stock with an opportunity to dispose of a number of shares (representing, for each Company stockholder, the same proportion of owned shares of Common Stock as ESL proposes to dispose of) in such transaction on the same terms and conditions, including price per share, as ESL. It is understood that (i) sales in the open market shall be deemed to be at prevailing market prices and (ii) (a) the transfer of Shares of Common Stock from one ESL affiliate subject to this Agreement to another, (b) distributions by ESL to its shareholders or limited partners, and (c) sales to the Company or third parties approved by at least two directors representing a majority of the independent, disinterested directors unaffiliated with ESL, shall not constitute a disposition subject to this Section 6.3(a).

(b) ESL shall not pursue, either directly or indirectly, including as part of a group, a transaction resulting in the acquisition of all or substantially all of the shares of Common Stock not owned by ESL or by such group (including, for example, in a leveraged recap in which “stub equity” is left in the hands of some or all of the non-ESL stockholders) unless the following procedures and requirements are followed and satisfied. The Board shall establish a committee of independent, disinterested directors unaffiliated with ESL (the “Special Committee”) to review and evaluate any transaction (other than any such transaction in which ESL would be treated on the same basis as all other Company stockholders) proposed by ESL or in which ESL intends to participate, with full authority to negotiate and recommend the terms of such a transaction on behalf of the Company and the non-ESL stockholders. ESL will proceed only with a transaction recommended by the Special Committee, unless the acquisition is structured as a “non-coercive” tender offer, followed by a merger at the same price if the offer is successful, not subject to the test of “entire fairness” in accordance with applicable Delaware case law (e.g., the decisions involving Silconix and Pure Resources), assuming, for these purposes, that the Company had been incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware and was subject to Delaware law.

(c) The provisions of this Section 6.3 may be enforced by any directors constituting a majority of the independent, disinterested directors unaffiliated with ESL or, in the absence of any such persons sitting on the Board, through a derivative action.

Section 6.4 Information Regarding Common Stock.

If ESL increases or decreases the number of Subject Shares it owns at any time prior to the Termination Date, ESL shall give prompt notice to the Company of such increase or decrease (which notice may be satisfied by a filing of a Form 4 with the Securities and Exchange Commission on a timely basis). If requested by ESL, the Company shall promptly provide ESL with the number of Outstanding Shares.

Section 8.1 Termination.

This Agreement and all of its provisions shall terminate upon the Termination Date; provided that Sections 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.7, 8.8, 8.9, 8.10, 8.13 and, in the case of clause (b) below, 6.3 of this Agreement shall survive any termination of this Agreement. For purposes of this Agreement, “Termination Date” means the earliest of (a) the date upon which the Subject Shares shall, in the aggregate, constitute less than 25% of the Outstanding Shares, (b) the date upon which the Aggregate ESL Percentage shall exceed 50% and (c) the date upon which the Parties (which, in the case of the Company, shall have been authorized by at least two directors representing a majority of the independent and disinterested members of the Board unaffiliated with ESL) mutually agree in writing that this Agreement and all of its provisions shall no longer be in effect. Nothing in this Section 8.1 shall be deemed to release any Party from any liability for any breach by such Party of their representations and warranties or any other terms and provisions of this Agreement.

Full Filing

Disclosure (“none” means no position):None

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Borders (BGP) CEO George Jones (video)

This was an interesting interview of the Borders (BGP) CEO and unfortunately way too short..

Jones talks about the consumer, the new direction, Barners & Noble (BKS) and other possible buyers.

Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long BGP, none

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More on Lampert’s AutoZone (AZO) Agreement

I posted the agreement between Eddie Lampert and Autozone (AZO) this morning and got a flood of questions. Reader Jeff answered 90% of them with this post.

“EBITDAR- Earnings Before Dep./Amor, Interest, Taxes, Rent (lease payments).

Thus, the company can take on long term debt of 2.5x its annual EBITDAR. Relatively modest leverage.

The voting restriction for ESL is basically saying that, if he continues to accumulate, the shares he gets over a certain level (40% now, coming down to 37.5%), he will need to vote them in proportion to how the rest of AZO’s shareholders vote.

So, if all non-ESL shareholders vote 50/50, in aggregate, ESL will be required to vote any of its shares in excess of 40% 50/50 as well. This will stay in effect as long as ESL’s ownership remains in the range of 25% – 50%.

So Lampert gets his wish that they continue to recap a bit, taking on more leverage and buying back more shares, in exchange for some voting concessions.”

Now, something interesting. With the new repurchase allotment, Autozone will be repurchasing 8% of the outstanding shares. By default, this will bring Lampert’s ownership up to 44.2% without him buying another share.

That will leave 5.8% (338 thousand shares) left for him to purchase in order for him to invalidate the agreement and vote his shares as he wishes because he will then own 50% of the shares.

One had to wonder then, what is the point of the agreement? Was Lampert pushing for something now and has decided to back off in return for an 8% ownership increase via the repurchase?

It is the only explanation as the agreement simply by itself, for no alternative reason makes no sense and is meaningless.

Something is going on….

Ideas?

Disclosure (“none” means no position):None

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More on Lampert's AutoZone (AZO) Agreement

I posted the agreement between Eddie Lampert and Autozone (AZO) this morning and got a flood of questions. Reader Jeff answered 90% of them with this post.

“EBITDAR- Earnings Before Dep./Amor, Interest, Taxes, Rent (lease payments).

Thus, the company can take on long term debt of 2.5x its annual EBITDAR. Relatively modest leverage.

The voting restriction for ESL is basically saying that, if he continues to accumulate, the shares he gets over a certain level (40% now, coming down to 37.5%), he will need to vote them in proportion to how the rest of AZO’s shareholders vote.

So, if all non-ESL shareholders vote 50/50, in aggregate, ESL will be required to vote any of its shares in excess of 40% 50/50 as well. This will stay in effect as long as ESL’s ownership remains in the range of 25% – 50%.

So Lampert gets his wish that they continue to recap a bit, taking on more leverage and buying back more shares, in exchange for some voting concessions.”

Now, something interesting. With the new repurchase allotment, Autozone will be repurchasing 8% of the outstanding shares. By default, this will bring Lampert’s ownership up to 44.2% without him buying another share.

That will leave 5.8% (338 thousand shares) left for him to purchase in order for him to invalidate the agreement and vote his shares as he wishes because he will then own 50% of the shares.

One had to wonder then, what is the point of the agreement? Was Lampert pushing for something now and has decided to back off in return for an 8% ownership increase via the repurchase?

It is the only explanation as the agreement simply by itself, for no alternative reason makes no sense and is meaningless.

Something is going on….

Ideas?

Disclosure (“none” means no position):None

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